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This dissertation examines the effects of two sources of asymmetric information on 
organizational performance. The first source, residual knowledge, is conceptualized in the first 
chapter as the knowledge held by organizations about their former resources that now belong to 
competitor organizations. It is posited that residual knowledge can lead to a competitive advantage 
against the focal rival relative to its other competitors by complementing the resources deployed 
against them in dyadic competition. The second source of asymmetric information, illicit 
competitive intelligence, is posited to lead to competitive advantage by providing an organization 
with exclusive access to a competitor’s secret information for use against them in dyadic 
competition. 
Chapters 2 and 3 test the effects of each source of asymmetric information respectively on 
organizational performance under certain conditions within the empirical context of Major League 
Baseball. Results from analysis of the relative performance of batters against their former 
organizations over 32 years in Chapter 2 corroborate the hypothesis that advantages from residual 
knowledge will erode with the proliferation of analytics capabilities across competitors. Evidence 
to corroborate the hypotheses related to employee and manager quality is not found. Chapter 3 
exploits the Houston Astros cheating scandal from 2017-2018 as a documented usage of illicit 
competitive intelligence. A difference-in-differences approach analyzing home and away 
performance before and after the cheating period finds no evidence to corroborate the hypotheses 
relating the use of illicit competitive intelligence to positive performance. Implications of the 
findings and non-findings for each are discussed. Chapter 4 summarizes the dissertation and 
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CHAPTER 1: THE ROLE OF RESIDUAL KNOWLEDGE IN THE RESOURCE- AND 
KNOWLEDGE-BASED VIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
Organizations are motivated to seek sources of knowledge to complement management’s 
task of coordinating and deploying the organization’s resources (Makadok & Barney, 2001; 
Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008; Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). Barney (1986) identifies the two 
fundamental sources of knowledge as the externally-focused search of the competitive 
environment and the internally-focused search of the tangible and intangible resources composing 
the organization. While both sources may yield economically valuable knowledge, an analysis of 
the knowledge under an organization’s direct control is posited to be more likely to provide the 
organization with an informational advantage over its competitors. This differential is due to the 
organization having exclusive access to its own resources (Ecker, van Triest, & Williams, 2013) 
and its resulting capability to develop a unique stock of knowledge for the enhancement of the 
bundling and deployment of specific resources (Berman, Down, & Hill, 2002; Dierickx & Cool, 
1989; King & Zeithaml, 2001; Kor, 2003).  
However, the seemingly clear distinction between the external and internal sources of 
knowledge becomes fuzzy when examined over time. In the long run (Sirmon et al., 2008), an 
organization makes resource management decisions beyond what to do with its current resources 
– including decisions to divest excess resources and acquire more promising ones (Helfat & 
Peteraf, 2003; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011). When an organization parts with its 
internally controlled resources or resource combinations, willingly or not1, those resources become 
elements of the external competitive environment. As resources leave the organization, the legacy 
 




knowledge pertaining to the exiting resource, referred to here as “residual knowledge,” may remain 
with the organization after the exit is completed. However, residual knowledge that applies 
specifically to an exited resource is ostensibly valueless to the organization that no longer controls 
the usage of the resource, nor directly appropriates any future value it generates.  
This chapter provides the case for the residual knowledge concept and submits that it can 
provide value to an organization under certain conditions. Six related areas are briefly reviewed 
and connected to the residual knowledge concept: asymmetric information, the resource-based 




The strategic management field is fundamentally concerned with explaining performance 
differences across organizations (Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1991). One explanation for 
performance differences is the market friction of asymmetric information, which is defined as one 
in which one party to an exchange has more or better information than the other party (Akerlof, 
1970). Asymmetric information is a central concept across the strategic management field 
(Mahoney & Qian, 2013) and related subfields such as corporate strategy (Bergh, Johnson, & 
Dewitt, 2008; Coff, 1999), human resource management (Raffiee & Coff, 2015; Riley, Michael, 
& Mahoney, 2017), and entrepreneurship (Hallen & Eisenhardt, 2012; Zott & Huy, 2007). 
Moreover, it applies across theories, such as transaction costs economics (Oxley, 1997; 
Williamson, 1975), signaling (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Reuer, Tong, & Wu, 
2012; Spence, 1973), agency (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), property rights 
(Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Singh & Kundu, 2002), real options (Folta & Miller, 2002; Sakhartov 
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& Folta, 2014), and the primary theoretical lenses for this dissertation the resource- and 
knowledge-based views (Barney, 1991; Coff, 1999; Conner & Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Kraaijenbrink, Spender, & Groen, 2010; Schmidt & Keil, 2013).  
An organization’s superior performance is said to be explained by the presence of one or 
more competitive advantages relative to their rivals (Barney, 1991; Powell, 2001; Sirmon, Hitt, 
Arregle, & Campbell, 2010; Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). Asymmetric information, can lead to 
superior performance for the holder when the sharing of that information with other parties would 
lead to them making different decisions (Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, & Boyd, 2019; 
Connelly et al., 2011). Superior performance from asymmetric information can be realized through 
the selling of resources for more than their worth or the buying of resources for less than their 
worth (Makadok & Barney, 2001). If the seller of resources withholds private information on those 
resources from their buyer ex ante, this is known as adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970). If one of 
the parties is able to privately influence the value of the resources ex post, this is known as moral 
hazard (Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971).  
The presence of asymmetric information can present a hazard to transacting that requires 
structural remedies to reduce costs and prevent market failures (Chi, 1994). Organizations may be 
able to further exploit asymmetric information through the provision of remedies and appropriation 
of the exchange value (Brush & Artz, 1999; Nayyar, 1990). Asymmetric information resulting 
from unequal spillovers can affect an organization’s innovation performance (Knott, Posen, & Wu, 
2009). 
Asymmetric information can arise from one party’s exclusive access to a source of 
information (Birkinshaw, Nobel, & Ridderstråle, 2002; Ecker et al., 2013). So long as this 
information is not intentionally shared or unintentionally leaked, it will remain exclusive to the 
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holding party. The next section discusses the resource-based view, which provides the framework 
for how exclusive access to an information source can provide an organization with superior 
performance. 
The Resource-Based View 
In exploring the nature of superior performance, two complementary paradigms have 
emerged. The industrial organization approach posits that organizations can realize superior 
performance by developing and defending profitable positions in economically attractive 
industries (Porter, 1985). Alternatively, the resource-based view (RBV) posits heterogeneity 
among organizations’ resources as a complementary, internally-focused explanation to the 
externally-focused industrial organization perspective (Barney & Clark, 2007; Kraaijenbrink et al., 
2010; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). 
Resources are defined as, “Anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness 
of a given firm…More formally…those assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm” 
(Wernerfelt, 1984, p.172). Falling under this umbrella definition of resources includes tangible 
assets, such as property, plant, and equipment, and intangible resources, such as knowledge, 
culture, and reputation that are, at least partially, under the organization’s control (Hall, 1992; 
Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Itami & Roehl, 1987; Miller & Shamsie, 1996). The semi-permanent ties 
that keep the bundling and deployment of resources under the control of the organization are 
known as isolating mechanisms (Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992).  
Resources that meet the standard of being valuable, rare, inimitable, and non-substitutable 
are strategic resources capable of providing an organization with a source of superior performance 
(Barney, 1991; Newbert, 2008; Peteraf, 1993; Rumelt, 1987). On the other side of the ledger, 
resources that meet the standard of being costly, supply-restricted, and appropriated are strategic 
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liabilities that damage and destroy an organization’s ability to generate economic rents (Arend, 
2004). Strategic liabilities, can lead to the erosion of superior performance for the holding 
organization (Sirmon et al., 2010; Warnier, Weppe, & Lecocq, 2013; West & DeCastro, 2001).  
One specific type of intangible resource, knowledge, has been identified as a key factor for 
determining organizational performance (Grant, 1996; Makadok & Barney, 2001; Nonaka, 1991; 
Shamsie & Mannor, 2013; Teece, 1998). The next section discusses the knowledge-based view 
and knowledge-based resources that are at the foundation of the residual knowledge concept. 
The Knowledge-Based View and Knowledge-Based Resources 
Knowledge is defined as, “Information whose validity has been established through tests 
of proof” (Liebeskind, 1996, p.94). As an extension of the RBV (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001), the 
knowledge-based view conceptualizes the organization as “A repository of knowledge that 
consists of how information is coded and action coordinated” (Kogut & Zander, 1993, p.626). In 
the RBV context, knowledge-based resources are defined as intangible resources of accumulated 
knowledge embedded within the routines and human capital of an organization that inform 
decisions pertaining to the organization’s other resources (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).  
Knowledge varies in its codifiability, complexity, and teachability as attributes that 
determine how difficult it is to protect that knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993). Explicit 
knowledge is easily codified and disseminated. It can be learned through reading or class 
instruction. Tacit knowledge, however, is difficult or impossible to codify. Because, “We know 
more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966, p.4), tacit knowledge must develop and be passed on 
through practical experience, insights, heuristic procedures and observation (Nelson & Winter, 
1982; Polanyi, 1966; Reed & DeFillippi, 1990).  
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As with other resources, knowledge-based resources can be specific to a given context. For 
example, knowledge that is specific to an organization’s customer base helps determine which 
products should be developed to increase economic surplus (Chatain, 2011; Schmidt & Keil, 
2013). Specific knowledge develops through continuous investment in a specific area. Dierickx 
and Cool (1989) conceptualize organizational knowledge as consisting of “stocks” of accumulated 
knowledge and “flows” of investment in knowledge streams that contribute to the stocks. The 
development of knowledge stocks through continuous investment is evidenced in the “learning 
curve” literature – as organizations accumulate experience for a specific task, they learn to be more 
efficient at that task (Delfgaauw & Swank, 2016; Lieberman, 1984; Wright, 1936). When a 
resource is wholly developed under the control of the former organization, the knowledge 
pertaining to it derived through exclusive access to it is uniquely held by the former organization. 
The specialized knowledge of individuals is integrated within the organization, where a 
collective knowledge base can be embedded into organizational routines and coordinated towards 
effective business models (Grant, 1996; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Organizational knowledge 
may be disseminated to individuals through practical experience over time and can be socially 
constructed through collaborative activities within informal communities of practitioners in the 
organization (Brown & Duguid, 1991). Knowledge is most efficiently shared within the 
organization when it is focused on the most strategically valuable information (Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1998). 
In addition to the accumulated knowledge of the individuals within, organizations may also 
seek to acquire new knowledge from external sources. For example, organizations may seek to 
acquire the knowledge-based resources of another organization through acquiring that 
organization (Ranft & Lord, 2000). Collaboration between an organization and other organizations 
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has also been identified as a means of bringing in new knowledge to the organization (Henderson 
& Cockburn, 1994; Inkpen & Tsang, 2005; Liebeskind, 1996). Acquired knowledge is developed 
within and about the external environment of an organization. Residual knowledge is distinguished 
from acquired knowledge in that it pertains to the external environment but is developed within 
the organization through investments made over time.    
An organization’s developed base of complementary prior knowledge is a key determinant 
of the organization’s absorptive capacity, which is its ability to recognize valuable information in 
the external environment, assimilate that information, and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001; Helfat, 1997). This path-dependent process requires 
the organization’s management to apply its prior knowledge base in making decisions on the 
management of complementary resources, which is detailed in the following section. 
Resource Management 
While resources may possess the requisite characteristics for providing superior 
performance, the managers in the organization must first make decisions on the bundling and 
deployment of those resources for any advantage to be realized (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Castanias 
& Helfat, 2001; Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; Holcomb, Holmes, & Connelly, 2009; Huesch, 2013; 
Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Sirmon et al., 2007; Villalonga & McGahan, 2005) Bundling decisions 
pertain to the combination of a given resource with additional, complementary resources 
(Carpenter, Sanders, & Gregersen, 2001; Somaya, Williamson, & Zhang, 2007; Teece, Pisano, & 
Shuen, 1997), while deployment decisions pertain to how organizations engage their resource to 
seek superior performance (Sirmon et al., 2011).  
The organization’s managerial capital, through making these decisions, can contribute to 
value creation, as stated by Penrose “The experience of management will affect the productive 
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services that all its resources are capable of rendering” (1959, p.5). Managers apply their 
knowledge, skills, abilities and other characteristics (KSAOs), in combination with the knowledge-
based routines embedded in the organization, towards improving the allocation of the 
organization’s resources in seeking to increase economic rents (Adner & Helfat, 2003; Barney, 
1991; Huesch, 2013; Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Penrose, 1959; Rugman & Verbeke, 2002; Sirmon et al., 2007). Managerial capital is closely akin 
to human capital in that it consists of the KSAOs of the managers within the organization. 
Managerial capital is distinguished from other types of human capital in that while human capital 
typically represents factors of production, managerial capital is specifically dedicated to the 
coordination of the organization’s resources towards increasing their productivity (Castanias & 
Helfat, 1991; Penrose, 1959).  
Managerial capital is acquired, at least in part, from learning-by-doing (Katz, 1955; 
Shamsie & Mannor, 2013) and can be consist of capital both generalized and specific to the context 
in which it is developed (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Campbell, Saxton, & Banerjee, 2014; Castanias 
& Helfat, 2001; Kor, 2003; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). Because some key managerial functions 
are ubiquitous across the profession, the KSAOs associated with these functions are considered 
generally valuable for all managers to possess, however, certain managerial skills may be more 
valuable in some contexts than in others (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gerstein & Reisman, 1983; 
Lazear, 2005; Mackey, Molloy, & Morris, 2014). Some capabilities are applicable only in specific 
organizations or industries (or their related industries), in certain locations (Huckman & Pisano, 
2006), with certain colleagues (Campbell et al., 2014), or in a given strategic situation in which 
the organization finds itself (Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Baker & Nelson, 2005; Groysberg, McLean, 
& Nohria, 2006). 
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As the KSAOs of management are heterogeneous across organizations, they can potentially 
represent a source of an organization’s superior performance (Barney & Clark, 2007; Castanias & 
Helfat, 1991, 2001; Helfat & Martin, 2015; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Holcomb et al., 2009; 
Levenson, Van der Stede, & Cohen, 2006; Mahoney, 1995; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). The 
contribution to value creation from managers is especially notable when the organization features 
resources which are inferior to their competitors. When managers develop better knowledge of the 
specific resources of an organization, these managers will make better decisions pertaining to the 
manner of the resources’ deployment (Kor, 2003; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Sirmon et al., 2011). 
Alchian and Demsetz note that, “Efficient production with heterogeneous resources is a result not 
of having better resources, but in knowing more accurately the relative productive performances 
of those resources” (1972, p.793). 
As such, the knowledge-based resources of the organization have a direct impact on the 
deployment of the organization’s other resources. The transfer of such rich information is 
facilitated by proximity and specialized channels (Teece, 1998). Lower and mid-level managers 
who work directly with the organization’s strategic resources are therefore more likely to develop 
knowledge that is specific to those resources than are managers at the executive level whose 
concerns are more structural in nature (Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; King 
& Zeithaml, 2001; Sirmon et al., 2007; Wooldridge, Schmid, & Floyd, 2008). 
While managers can improve organization performance through their actions on its existing 
resources of the firm, a comprehensive discussion of the management of an organization’s 
resources includes the shedding of organization-controlled resources through the decision to divest 
excessive resources, those which are unlikely to contribute to an organization’s superior 
performance (Sirmon et al., 2007). Through divestment of unnecessary resources, organizations 
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can create the slack necessary to develop and/or acquire resources more capable of contributing to 
superior performance (Berry, 2010; Penrose, 1959; Tan & Mahoney, 2007).  
The extant literature’s discussion of indirect returns from divestments focuses on 
developing divestment capabilities (Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007), establishing trust (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998), and developing social capital (Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 2008). However, 
while “divestment” implies that an organization is making an active choice to remove resources, 
an organization may also lose control over its resources involuntarily. This outcome is most 
commonly illustrated in the case of employee mobility, i.e. when employees freely choose to leave 
their organization. An organization’s capability to use residual knowledge of its former resources, 
including employees, as a complement in future competitive engagements is posited to be a 
potential source of value to be derived from the divestment of strategic resources. 
Employee Mobility 
The employee mobility literature examines the organizational effects of the movement of 
a specific type of resource, the human capital embedded in an organization’s employees 
(Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). Human capital refers to the cumulative KSAOs of individuals 
employed by the organization that are tied to it through one or more isolating mechanisms (Barney, 
1991; Becker, 1964; Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 2012a; Nyberg, Moliterno, Hale, & Lepak, 
2014; Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011; Sirmon et al., 2008). Becker (1964) conceptualizes human 
capital as an aggregation of skills that have different loci of relevance; in other words, the human 
capital of an individual employee, as with managers, can be partitioned according to its relevance 
in other settings (Campbell et al., 2014; Mayer, Somaya, & Williamson, 2012; Ployhart & 
Moliterno, 2011).  
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Organizations typically possess more knowledge of their own human capital than they do 
about external human capital (Bidwell, 2011; Moliterno & Wiersema, 2007). The organization 
may make better use of its human capital when it correctly assigns its workers to where they can 
have higher productivity in the organization (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Tomer, 1987). Thus, 
managers can impact the degree to which an employee’s human capital leads to performance by 
assigning workers to their best fit in the organization according to the extent of their knowledge 
of their employees (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Sirmon et al., 2008). 
Employee mobility, in a general sense, means an increase in the receiving organization’s 
human capital and a corresponding decrease in the human capital of the providing organization 
(Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016; Somaya et al., 2008). For 
the organization receiving new human capital, the addition is not necessarily seamless and may be 
fraught with hazards. An employee’s knowledge developed from prior work experience may 
include routines and habits that won’t apply to their work with the new organization (Dokko, Wilk, 
& Rothbard, 2009). Thus, the hiring organization may underestimate the extent to which new 
human capital’s value is specific to the conditions of their previous organization (Groysberg, Lee, 
& Nanda, 2008; Groysberg, Nanda, & Nohria, 2004). Moreover, colleagues working in teams will 
develop specific knowledge of one another over time and learn how to work more efficiently as a 
collective. The injection of new employees disrupts this team-specific human capital, which must 
be rebuilt over a time period during which the benefits from the new KSAOs are mitigated 
(Campbell et al., 2014).  
While the negative effects of mobility can mitigate the benefits for a hiring organization, 
the downside for organizations losing their employees through turnover can be significantly worse 
(Call, Nyberg, Ployhart, & Weekley, 2015). Several potential negative effects that an employee’s 
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exit can have include disruption of internal teams (Briscoe & Rogan, 2016), erosion of superior 
performance through transfer of valuable routines to other organizations (Aime, Johnson, Ridge, 
& Hill, 2010), and a loss of key clients (Somaya et al., 2008) which can cumulatively lead to 
catastrophic outcomes for the organization (Campbell, Ganco, Franco, & Agarwal, 2012b; Wezel, 
Cattani, & Pennings, 2006). The costs associated with employee exit to the originating 
organization include the costs associated with providing on-the-job training and development that 
were not passed on to the employee (Becker, 1964). 
For the providing organization, these negatives can be offset, at least partially, by new 
benefits stemming from improvements in the organization’s relationship with the recipient 
organization when an employee(s) moves to a client or supplier (Somaya et al., 2008). However, 
when employees move to existing, or spinout to become competitors of their original organization 
instead (Agarwal, Campbell, Franco, & Ganco, 2016), the literature regards it as being mostly 
negative for the originating firm, due to the absence of offsetting benefits and the likelihood that 
the transferred KSAOs will be used against the originating organization in an adversarial manner 
(Carnahan & Somaya, 2013; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007; Grohsjean, Kober, & Zucchini, 2016).2  
When the human capital embedded within an individual employee departs, the related 
knowledge developed by the firm over time, specifically pertaining to the departed employee’s 
bundling and deployment, may remain embedded within the human capital and routines of the 
originating firm. This private knowledge represents asymmetric information, which is exclusive 
to the departed organization and could lead other parties planning to hire the employee to make 
different decisions were they privy to the knowledge (Bergh et al., 2019; Connelly et al., 2011).  
 
2 Exceptions to the negative impact of movement to competitors include the opportunity to expand exploration past 
the previous bounds of firm knowledge (Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014) and that exited firms of middle-status may 
experience improved performance in the labor market due to enhanced perceptions of status when employees move 
to high-status competitors (Tan & Rider, 2017). 
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Strategic Factor Markets Theory 
 Barney (1986) introduced strategic factor market theory for analyzing a competitive market 
for resource factors (or inputs) of uncertain value where profits are realized by firms purchasing 
undervalued resources while avoiding overpaying for resources (Maritan & Florence, 2008) – thus 
firms with superior information regarding the true value of market resources have an advantage 
(Leiblein, 2011).  
While Barney’s (1986) parsimonious framework included upstream and downstream 
components to the factor markets only by implication, as strategic factors and their profits they 
generate must come from somewhere, the literature has further explored the implications of these 
components and how they dynamically interact with the factor market. Regarding the upstream 
sellers of strategic factors, Ross (2012) and Chatain (2014) both recognize the agency of sellers to 
decide when to develop and sell strategic factors based on their assessments of the competitive 
environment. Similarly, Markman (2009), Chatain (2014), and Asmussen (2015) tie together factor 
markets and the respective downstream product markets where profits are generated, considering 
how competitive dynamics from each side can impact performance and behavior on the other.  
As with upstream and downstream components, the presence and importance of 
asymmetric information is implied in the framework, but questions as to what types of information, 
where it can be found, and how it can be acquired have been taken up by the literature since the 
framework was introduced. Makadok and Barney (2001) expands on the role of information to 
include more accurate assessments of the competing bidders in the market for strategic resources, 
as well as their information-gathering and processing capabilities (Makadok, 2001). The costliness 
of the search and acquisition of relevant information and how it influences factor market strategies 
is also considered (Maritan & Florence, 2008).  
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While the SFM model has been expanded upon, gaps remain that can be addressed by the 
concept of residual knowledge, specifically the asymmetric information held by firms who 
formerly possessed the strategic factors, and the subsequent competition in the downstream 
product market. Whereas competing bidders for strategic factors may continue to compete in the 
downstream product market where the factor is deployed, the sellers of strategic factors are 
traditionally removed from consideration in the framework following the completion of the factor 
market transaction. This removal of sellers from consideration in factor and product market 
frameworks is either by assumption of the seller’s inability to compete or the assumption that 
sellers are undistinguishable from other heterogeneous product market competitors. Regarding the 
first assumption – given that strategic factors are requisite to specific strategies in product markets, 
but not for competing in these markets, the divestment of a strategic factor should not preclude a 
seller from competing in the related product market. For the second assumption, asymmetric 
information regarding competitors and their resources can advantage organizations when making 
competitive actions that may be oriented towards the devaluation of a competitor’s specific 
resource (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Chen, 1996). Competitors in product and factor markets will 
engage in costly search for information which sellers may (effectively) costlessly possess 
regarding the value of a resource, as well as what future behavior that the seller may undertake 
that could potentially undermine that value.  
Based on the residual knowledge of the resources they have divested in factor markets, the 
presence and behavior of sellers in product markets could significantly impact the profit-
generating potential of a strategic resource, and thus warrants consideration in a comprehensive 




SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION 
The proceeding chapters further explore superior organizational performance derived from 
asymmetric information-based advantages, both using the empirical context of Major League 
Baseball.  
In chapter 2, the residual knowledge concept as a source of asymmetric information and 
the underpinning literatures for employee mobility and strategic factor market theory introduced 
here are further elaborated upon. Moderating effects for the impact of residual knowledge on 
performance are introduced and are based on the analytics, managerial capital, and human capital 
literatures. The moderating effects are then tested in the empirical setting of Major League 
Baseball. The results for the tests of moderating effects of analytics are statistically significant and 
consistent with the direction hypothesized, however the hypotheses regarding the moderating 
effects associated with the quality of managers and employees are rejected.  
Chapter 3 examines the effects of a different source of asymmetric information on 
organizational performance, illicit competitive intelligence. The competitive intelligence literature 
is reviewed with an emphasis on the under-examined area of illicit competitive intelligence, in 
which data about competitors are obtained through legally and/or ethically suspect sources. A 
theoretical case is made for a positive effect of illicit competitive intelligence on organizational 
performance, as well as moderating conditions for this positive effect based on the variety of 
competitor actions, the fidelity of the signal, and the relative competitive threat perceived by the 
organization. The empirical context of Major League Baseball is once more used to test the 
hypotheses, this time exploiting a documented case where illicit competitive intelligence was 
employed and its effects on organizational performance could be directly observed. Somewhat 
surprisingly, all hypotheses are rejected. Post hoc explanations for the rejection of hypotheses are 
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provided along with discussion of the potential reasons for the non-findings concerning 
competitive intelligence and organizational performance.  
Chapter 4 concludes the dissertation by discussing the implications of the two sources of 
asymmetric information examined, synthesizing the findings of the two empirical studies, and 
discussing future research directions. In addition to the underpinning concept of asymmetric 
information that links the dissertation chapters together, the shared context of Major League 
Baseball links the two empirical chapters. The utilization of sports contexts for the advancement 
of management theory is becoming more prominent due in large part to reliably measured 
performance and predictor variables that can be observed at a granular level allowing for tests of 
theories that are difficult if not impossible to conduct in an industrial or firm context. A discussion 
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CHAPTER 2: COMPETING WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION: IMPLICATIONS 




“…The sound in the room is the soft murmur of men swapping information. Duncan does most of 
the talking. La Russa listens, occasionally questioning or commenting, constantly writing notes 
in a tiny, meticulous shorthand. This meeting amounts to panning for gold, sifting mountains of 
mere gravel, one panful at a time, looking for glittering flakes. And finding them.” 
-George Will, describing a meeting between the 1988 Oakland Athletics coaching staff 
prior to a series with the Boston Red Sox (1990, p. 10).  
 
The focus of the strategic management field is on explaining differences in the performance 
of competing organizations3 (Rumelt et al., 1991). According to the resource-based view, 
heterogeneity in the sets of internal resources and capabilities across competing organizations can 
account for variance in average performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993; Wernerfelt, 1984). For realizing superior performance, few resources are considered as 
important as knowledge (Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996; Teece, 1998). Knowledge, defined as 
“Information whose validity has been established through tests of proof” (Liebeskind, 1996, p.94), 
determines the manner in which an organization’s resources will be deployed by its managers in 
the pursuit of superior performance (Grant, 1996; Mahoney, 1995; Penrose, 1959). An 
organization’s knowledge is embedded in its routines (Cyert & March, 1963; March & Simon, 
1958; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and its human capital, defined as the knowledge, skills, abilities, 
and other attributes (KSAOs) of its employees (Becker, 1964; Grant, 1996; Liebeskind, 1996). 
 
3 The term organization is used in this study as opposed to firm for purposes of inclusivity. Organization as 
used here is inclusive of all entities defined as firms, in addition to other types of entities that engage in 
interorganizational competitive behavior with one another using human capital resources available on the 
factor market.  
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Improving performance can require the organization and its employees to make mutual 
investments for developing knowledge specific to one another. For organizations, increasing the 
effectiveness of a specific employee involves developing an understanding of that employee’s 
relative strengths and weaknesses to inform decisions about their bundling and deployment 
(Prescott & Visscher, 1980; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009; Sirmon et al., 2007). Organizations develop 
knowledge of their employees through formal and informal interaction with management and 
routine performance monitoring (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Espinosa, Slaughter, Kraut, & Herbsleb, 
2007; Wooldridge et al., 2008). This essential knowledge is shared through and stored within the 
organization’s routines and human capital (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2001; Simon, 1991; Wiklund & 
Shepherd, 2003). For employees, improving their productivity means investment in developing a 
base of knowledge specific to the idiosyncrasies of their organization (Wang, He, & Mahoney, 
2009; Williamson, 1985). To this purpose, employees may have privileged access to the 
knowledge and other resources that are critical to their superior performance (Birkinshaw et al., 
2002; Ecker et al., 2013), including those which the organization endeavors to keep hidden (Cohen, 
Nelson, & Walsh, 2000; Liebeskind, 1997). 
Human capital, and by extension the knowledge composing it, is distinguished from other 
resources by its inherent transience (Coff, 1997; Simon, 1991). Apart from the loss of human 
capital, the migration of its employees, especially those privileged with access to key resources, 
can potentially lead to serious consequence for an organization, depending on the nature of the 
mobility event. For example, when employees leave to join with a supplier, customer, or other 
collaborative organization, the originating organization may benefit from the resulting stronger 
ties these employees develop with the receiving organization (Carnahan & Somaya, 2013; 
Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016; Somaya et al., 2008). However, when employees leave to join or start 
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up a competitor organization, the outlook for the original organization is, with few exceptions, 
considered to be negative (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009; Campbell et al., 2012; Mawdsley 
& Somaya, 2016; Tan & Rider, 2017; Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014).  
The condition where one party has more and/or better information than another is known 
as asymmetric information (Akerlof, 1970; Holmstrom, 1979), which can lead or contribute to a 
competitive advantage (Weingart, Hyder, & Prietula, 1996). The negative outlook associated with 
employees moving to competitors is attributed, in part, to the likelihood that the KSAOs of the 
employee will be deployed against their former organization, threatening any previous superior 
performance the organization derived from information or knowledge asymmetries (Aime et al., 
2010; Grohsjean et al., 2016; Wezel et al., 2006). While research has focused on the negative 
outcomes for organizations when its asymmetric information is propagated through its employees 
leaving for competitors, there has been little attention given to the accompanying condition where 
the organization has asymmetric information about their former employees who are now with 
competitors. When employees leave, the knowledge that their organization developed about them 
over their tenure may remain embedded in the organization’s routines and human capital. The 
scant attention given to an organization’s knowledge of their departed employees, henceforth 
termed “residual knowledge,” might be explained by the fact that knowledge about a specific 
employee is ostensibly useless if the organization no longer directly makes decisions pertaining to 
their bundling and deployment, nor directly appropriates the value they generate. In contrast, this 
study proposes that the information asymmetries associated with residual knowledge can provide 
an organization with superior performance when the organization engages in direct, representative 
competition with their former employee’s new organization.  
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The phenomenon of representative competition, where organization-level outcomes are 
largely determined by the efforts of individual employees in isolation, can be witnessed in 
numerous business contexts such as employee recruitment (Rynes & Barber, 1990), engagement 
with suppliers and alliance partners, sales negotiations with new customers, legal proceedings, and 
government lobbying efforts. In representative competition, the former employee, with the support 
of their new organization, will apply their knowledge, skills, abilities, and other attributes 
(KSAOs) against their former organization, which can include private information about the 
organization. Likewise, the former organization will deploy its current resources at the discretion 
of management whose decisions can be informed, in part, by residual private knowledge (known 
to the organization but not by others) about the former employee. As such, each side may have 
private information about the other, not known to other organizations or individuals in similar 
competitive contexts, which may be called upon in seeking superior performance vis-à-vis 
competitors. This reasoning, however, begs the question: which party’s privately held knowledge 
of the other tends to lead to superior performance and under what conditions?  
This study examines the aforementioned research question through a strategic factor 
markets (SFM) lens, where the strategic factor of a mobile employee leaves the former 
organization, generalized as the seller in the SFM lens, to join with (or to startup) a destination 
organization, generalized as the buyer in the SFM lens. While buyers and potential buyers receive 
the bulk of the attention in the SFM literature, much less has been paid to the role of sellers of 
strategic resources (Asmussen, 2015; Chatain, 2014). In typical models, sellers have been 
portrayed exogenously, seemingly included because some entity must exist to sell the resource of 
concern to the potential buyers. While there has been recent work that provides sellers in SFMs 
with some degree of agency in determining the market timing and development plans for their 
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strategic resources (Chatain, 2014), even here sellers are removed from models once the SFM has 
closed and the focus shifts to the subsequent product market. The SFM literature, thus, has yet to 
examine the implications of sellers of strategic resources competing with buyers in the subsequent 
product market. Does a seller’s asymmetric information about the strategic resource provide them 
with an advantage in subsequent competition against competitors’ whose strategies employ the 
former resource? Stated differently, can the presence of the seller of a strategic factor in the 
subsequent product market potentially degrade the value of the buyer’s purchased resource? 
While the processes behind developing knowledge differ for individual employees and 
organizations, the medium through which the learning of asymmetric information takes place is 
the same, namely the exclusive access afforded via organizational membership. Therefore, as each 
party to the subsequent competition between organizations and former employees may have 
information asymmetries in their knowledge of the other, competing hypotheses are derived for 
the main effects of relative advantage between the organization and the former employee. The 
subsequent, conditional hypotheses are based on factors that should favor one side over the other 
– including the adoption of analytics capabilities as a substitute for residual knowledge and the 
relative quality of the organization’s managers and individual employees.  
The empirical setting of Major League Baseball used for testing the hypotheses is 
appropriate for several reasons. In baseball, superior performance at the organizational level is 
attributed largely to the collective talent of the players on the major league roster, which is 
composed through some combination of internally developed and externally acquired players 
(Anderson, 1984; Koppett, 1967; Maritan & Peteraf, 2011). When players are acquired externally, 
whether through free agency or trade, they will have had some degree of experience under the 
control of another organization. 
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Applied to the context of Major League Baseball, the “product market” term from the 
strategic factor market lens does not refer to a literal product market where the goods and services 
that competing organizations produce through a value chain are sold to customers for a profit. 
Instead, “product market” is defined here more generally as a competitive space subsequent to a 
strategic factor market, where purchased factors can be applied in the implementation of a given 
competitive strategy. This definition fits with the on-field competitive context of Major League 
Baseball, where organizations seek wins against one another in direct competition by scoring more 
runs than their opponent.  
As is the case with other research that utilizes sports contexts to advance management 
theory, data on performance at the individual and organizational levels are abundant (Day, Gordon, 
& Fink, 2012; Wolfe et al., 2005). Because movement of players across organizations is a 
relatively common occurrence for established players with lengthy careers4, there should be a 
sufficiently large sample size.  
As the interest of this research is in explaining the variance in competitive performance 
between employees and their former organizations, it is essential that an individual’s performance 
can be measured in relative isolation from the contribution of their current organization and/or 
other individuals in their organization (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Eisenhardt, 1985). In sports 
such as football or rugby, where positive outcomes stem from interdependent actions from all team 
members, the separation of individual contribution to outcomes can be difficult to measure. In 
contrast, baseball is structured as a series of individual matchups between pitchers and batters 
where outcomes clearly favor one side or the other. Further, by focusing specifically on batters, 
 
4 All players average around two teams played for in a career (Moehringer, 2019), though veteran players like Matt 
Stairs and Royce Clayton played for 12 and 11 different teams respectively. 
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we can avoid concerns of bias from the contribution of fielders to an individual pitcher’s 
performance.  
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, background is provided on the 
two primary research streams used to frame the research, being employee mobility and strategic 
factor markets. Then, competing and conditional hypotheses are presented to be tested in the 
empirical context. In the following section describing the research design, supplemental 
background on the MLB empirical context, the operationalization of the variables, and the 
specification of the model is provided. The results are presented followed by discussion of the 
contributions, limitations, and potential avenues for future research.   
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Strategic Factor Markets and Asymmetric Information in Downstream Competition 
“I felt that you couldn’t know enough about a ballplayer, about his personality, his 
background. I would always make an effort to meet the players’ wives and parents; I wanted to 
know them. I think these things are important in the overall makeup of a ball club. I wanted to 
know just as much about them as they knew about themselves, and more if possible. Sometimes a 
man’s off-the-field problems can have an effect on his performance on the field, and it can be 
helpful for you to have some understanding of them. You can’t do this unless you make a study of 
it and spend a lot of time with your ballplayers and let them know you’re sympathetic.” 
-Eddie Sawyer (Honig, 1977) 
Organizations compete against one another in product markets by applying different 
strategies intended to concentrate strengths against the opponent’s relative weaknesses (Barney, 
1986; Henderson, 1979). Successfully executing a given strategy requires organizations to have 
the requisite set of strategic resources to do so coherently (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Strategic resources are those resources capable of being used alone or in combination with other 
complementary resources to enact a given strategy in the product market (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 
1993). Strategic resources may be acquired through internal development (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) 
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or, when possible, purchased through strategic factor markets (Barney, 1986; Kim, Hoskisson, & 
Lee, 2015; Maritan & Peteraf, 2011).  
As an example, organizations in Major League Baseball routinely buy and sell strategic 
resources on the market in the form of players, managers, and other support personnel (Moliterno 
& Wiersema, 2007; Sirmon et al., 2008). A baseball team is therefore dependent on the attributes 
of its individual players to enact effectively the strategy determined by its management. To 
illustrate, the 1982 World Series featured two organizations that differed substantially in terms of 
the attributes of the players that made up their rosters and the strategies that each team had 
employed to win their respective league’s pennant (Feldmann, 2018). The St. Louis Cardinals, 
managed by Whitey Herzog, featured a roster composed of lean, fast athletes who could execute 
Herzog’s preferred strategy of “Whitey-ball” which eschewed power-hitting for speed, defense, 
and line-drive hits. In contrast, the Milwaukee Brewers, managed by Harvey Kuenn, had a roster 
of strong power-hitters who had combined to hit 216 home runs that season (compared to the 67 
home runs hit by the Cardinals), earning them the nickname “Harvey’s Wall-Bangers.” Were the 
respective managers of each organization to use the other’s strategy, it would be incoherent due to 
the poor fit with the KSAOs of the players for each organization. 
The strategic factor market literature is founded on a basic model consisting of a seller of 
a strategic resource and multiple potential buyers who compete with one another for 
ownership/control of the resource (Markman et al., 2009). After the SFM closes, the winning 
organization(s) seeks to recoup their costs by deploying the resource as a core component of their 
strategy in a subsequent downstream product market (Asmussen, 2015; Chatain, 2014).  
Under perfectly competitive market conditions, where the true value of all resources are 
known by all parties, no superior performance may be realized (Barney, 1986; Felin, Kauffman, 
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Mastrogiorgio, & Mastrogiorgio, 2016). By relaxing the perfect market assumption, SFM theory 
provides avenues through which superior performance can be derived by engaging in strategic 
factor markets, including possessing superior expectations of resource value (Makadok, 2011; 
Makadok & Barney, 2001), having greater complementarities from existing resources (Adegbesan, 
2009; Teece, 1986), discretion in timing the exercise of real options (Leiblein, Chen, & Posen, 
2017; Maritan & Florence, 2008), degradation of competitor resources (Capron & Chatain, 2008; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989), or even blind luck (Barney, 1986).  
Buyers purchase strategic factors based on their own expectations of resources to return 
greater value than the price that was paid for them (Barney, 1986). The expectations of the value 
of a resource and willingness to pay are heterogeneous across organizations – the perspective of 
potential buyers are shaped by their existing resources and information, as well as their ability to 
evaluate the resources and expectations held by their competitors (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 2003). 
Expectations that are more accurate as to the true value of a resource than the expectations of 
competitors will help organizations in picking undervalued resources and avoiding resources that 
are overpriced (Capron & Mitchell, 2009; Capron & Shen, 2007; Makadok, 2001). 
Organizations seek out information that will provide more accurate expectations of a 
resource’s true value (Makadok, 2011; Schmidt & Keil, 2013), as well as the expectations and 
strategies of their rivals (Makadok & Barney, 2001). Organizations can acquire this information 
through two fundamental types of costly searches for informational advantage: externally directed 
searches that focus on analysis of the competitive environment and internally directed searches 
that focus on analysis of the organization’s  current portfolio of skills and capabilities (Barney, 
1986; Kahaner, 1996; Makadok & Barney, 2001; Ross, 2012). While both types of searches can 
provide information leading to an advantage, internally directed searches are systematically more 
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likely to yield information leading to superior performance because the scope of externally directed 
search is limited to publicly available data and methodologies and, thus, may be easily duplicated 
by competitors (Barney & Clark, 2007). Any superior performance that can be derived from 
information found in an external search would have to be due to the organization’s possession of 
superior analytical capabilities to their rivals, and is sustainable only to the extent that these 
capabilities must be developed internally instead of purchased on the market (Barney & Clark, 
2007; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Maritan & Peteraf, 2011).  
Asymmetric information represents opportunities for superior performance by exploiting 
knowledge exclusively held by the organization that would lead their competitors to make different 
decisions were they also privy to that knowledge (Bergh et al., 2019; Chatain, 2011; Connelly et 
al., 2011). In the SFM discourse, asymmetric information can lead to superior performance when 
the information provides one organization with superior expectations of a resource’s value and/or 
a competitor’s strategy than its competitors (Barney, 1986), which is then typically used to gain 
an advantage in the competition to build or acquire resources (Makadok, 2001). 
An organization might develop asymmetric information via unique access to resources 
directly under their control, such as employees (Birkinshaw et al., 2002; Ecker et al., 2013). 
Organizations are incentivized to develop a knowledge base of their employees so as to utilize 
them more effectively in the future (Prescott & Visscher, 1980). An organization develops 
knowledge of their employees through formal and informal interaction with management and 
routine performance monitoring (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Hatch & Dyer, 2004; Wooldridge et al., 
2008) – knowledge that is then shared through and stored within the organization’s routines and 
human capital (Dosi, 1988; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003).  
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Organizations pursuing knowledge about another organization or its employees are limited, 
in theory, to externally focused searches in the domain of publicly available data, as well as their 
own capabilities for the collection and analysis of these data (Barney, 1986; Denrell et al., 2003). 
Conversely, internally focused searches within the domain of an organization’s current portfolio 
of resources are systematically more capable of providing information asymmetries leading to 
superior performance. To the degree that organizations are heterogeneous with respect to the 
portfolio of resources that comprise them, the information acquired through internal searches of 
organizational resources is likely to be asymmetric. Further, access to resources for the purposes 
of conducting internally focused searches may be restricted to the current employees of the 
organization, meaning any information derived from this search will be, at least initially, exclusive 
to the organization (Ecker et al., 2013; King & Zeithaml, 2001). So long as the knowledge does 
not spillover to other organizations and it maintains its value, organizations and employees can, 
potentially, achieve superior performance derived from asymmetric information (Newbert, 2008).   
The Role of Sellers in Strategic Factor Markets 
Concerning strategic factor markets, Barney (1986) provided the real-world example of the 
acquisition of firms, and subsequent research has used acquisitions as a context for strategic factor 
markets (Capron & Shen, 2007). However, the use of the strategic resource term is not exclusive 
to organization-level acquisitions. Strategic resources represent any components necessary to enact 
a given product market strategy, including specific individual employees (Kor & Leblebici, 2005; 
Lengnick-hall & Lengnick-hall, 1988; Younge, Tong, & Fleming, 2015). So long as the transfer 
of a strategic factor does not require the absorption of the seller organization as a whole into the 




As the literature implies both that sellers are capable of existing past the closing of a 
strategic factor market (Chatain, 2011) and that they have superior knowledge of the sold resource 
(Stigler, 1961), it is remarkable that the literature does not examine the interaction between factor 
market sellers and buyers in analyses of the subsequent product market where the resource is to be 
deployed. Given the superior position afforded through information asymmetries (Makadok, 
2011), sellers may have an advantage when they compete against their SFM exchange partner in 
the subsequent product market than the other potential buyers who didn’t meet the price for the 
resource. 
Employee Mobility 
According to the resource-based view, superior performance is derived from firm-specific 
resources that are scarce and superior to those of their competitors (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
Resources are defined as, “Anything which could be thought of as a strength or weakness of a 
given firm…More formally…those assets which are tied semi-permanently to the firm” 
(Wernerfelt, 1984, p.172). Included under this definition of resources are tangible resources such 
as property, plant, and equipment and intangible resources such as knowledge, culture, and 
reputation that fall under the firm’s control (Hall, 1992; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Itami & Roehl, 
1987; Miller & Shamsie, 1996).  
As resources, employees are distinguished theoretically from other tangible resources for 
many reasons, prominent among them that they are not subject to literal ownership by the 
organization and are free to leave at their discretion (Coff, 1997). Preventing employees from 
leaving the organization are isolating mechanisms, the semi-permanent ties that keep resources 
under the control of the firm (Barney, 1991; Lippman & Rumelt, 1982). For example, in the MLB 
context, the isolating mechanisms that keep players from leaving their organizations on a whim 
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are the contracts players enter into after they are drafted as amateurs or signed as free agents by a 
major league organization. When players are drafted, they are typically assigned to a minor league 
team within the major league organization and provided the opportunity to gain experience, 
develop their strengths, and address their weaknesses in an environment relatively free of 
consequence while being paid a nominal salary. In return, the player’s organization holds the rights 
over their contract for an amount of time that is dependent on when/if the player makes their debut 
on the major league roster. Until the player has satisfied the major league service time requirements 
set in their initial contract, their organization has the right to trade their contract to any other 
organization in the league. Prior to the repeal of Flood v Kuhn in 1975, organizations held 
exclusive rights to their players even after their initial contract expired, meaning players could 
only move between organizations via trade or relinquishment of rights (Helyar, 1994). In the 
modern free agency era, once a player has satisfied the service time on his initial contract, he is 
free to sign a new contract with any organization in the league as a free agent.    
The literature on employee mobility looks at the antecedents and consequences of when 
employees leave their organizations to join others (Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Mawdsley 
& Somaya, 2016). Generally, when an employee moves, their new organization acquires the 
knowledge, skills, abilities and other attributes (KSAOs) of the employee which are 
correspondingly lost by the former organization (Gardner, 2005; Mawdsley & Somaya, 2016). 
Beyond this basic model, the literature identifies numerous contingencies that can affect the 
distribution of benefits and detriments resulting from an employee’s exit (Campbell et al., 2014; 
Groysberg et al., 2008), including the nature of the relationship between the former and new 
organizations. While employee movement to suppliers and customers may provide benefits to the 
original organization in the form of increased social capital and business opportunities (Carnahan 
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& Somaya, 2013; Somaya et al., 2008), movement of employees to competitors is likely to result 
in negative outcomes (Campbell et al., 2012).   
Of particular concern is the transfer of organizational knowledge that may occur from 
employee movement to a rival (Agarwal et al., 2016, 2009; Aime et al., 2010; Campbell et al., 
2012; Franco & Filson, 2006; Rao & Drazin, 2002).5 When employees move from one 
organization to another, they take with them their knowledge, skills, abilities and other 
characteristics (KSAOs) (Madsen, Mosakowski, & Zaheer, 2003; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003). 
The ability to obtain new knowledge through hiring is cited as a motivating factor when 
organizations poach employees from their competitors (Agarwal et al., 2009; Gardner, 2002; Rao 
& Drazin, 2002). The knowledge employees take with them may include knowledge specific to 
their former organization, including trade secrets that the former organization may want to protect 
from leakage (Liebeskind, 1997). When an employee that has been privileged with access to an 
organization’s strategic resources moves to a competitor, the competitor could use the employee’s 
KSAOs in a manner that may be uniquely detrimental to the former organization (Aime et al., 
2010; Grohsjean et al., 2016; Wezel et al., 2006).  
As such, both the focal organization and their employees may possess knowledge specific 
to the other that is not accessible through the standard external inquiries of competitors. Thus, 
when an organization searches for an informational advantage within its stock of residual 
knowledge, it represents a hybrid of external and internal search in that an organization’s 
knowledge of external resources that it previously controlled is subject to the same exclusivity 
enjoyed for the knowledge of the internal resources currently under their control. 
 
5 Notwithstanding the presence of any noncompete covenants restricting the movement of employees (Marx, 
Strumsky, & Fleming, 2009) 
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Given the strategic importance of maintaining information asymmetries and the associated 
jeopardy of employee mobility, the literature’s focus on the negative outcomes of knowledge 
spillovers from inter-competitor employee mobility is clearly justified. With few exceptions (Tan 
& Rider, 2017; Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014), the literature regards employee movement to a 
competitor as almost always leading to negative outcomes for the former organization. However, 
when employees who are known well by their organization depart for a competitor, information 
asymmetries can arise that may lead to an advantage depending on the context as discussed in the 
next section.   
Asymmetric Information and Competing Against Organization Representatives 
One of the avenues an organization may take for achieving superior performance is through 
acting to persistently increase a competitor’s costs relative to their own (Arend, 2004; Salop & 
Scheffman, 1983, 1987). An organization can widen the costs gap between itself and a competitor 
by degrading the competitor’s individual resources (Capron & Chatain, 2008). According to 
Arend, “An outside party may also bestow strategic liabilities upon a firm…An outside party is 
not likely to bestow strategic assets on a firm, but it is certainly content to bestow strategic 
liabilities on a firm, especially when it is made relatively better off” (2004, p.1012).  
As organizations are inherently unable to directly control the resources of a competitor, 
they may instead undertake strategic actions, a sequence of moves and countermoves, intended to 
alter the environmental conditions faced by their competitors and direct them towards suboptimal 
decisions (Anderson & Tushman, 1990; Argyres, Bigelow, & Nickerson, 2015; Chen, Smith, & 
Grimm, 1992; Shapiro, 1989). One route organizations may take to derive a relative advantage 
over a given rival is to take actions that can impair the effectiveness, or value-creating ability, of 
its rivals’ resources so that “They can no longer serve demand with the same level of effectiveness” 
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(Capron & Chatain, 2008, p.99). In Capron and Chatain’s (2008) explanation, competitors can be 
undermined by an organization undertaking actions in the political market so as to make the 
institutional environment less hospitable for the competitor’s strategic resources to return value.  
In the context of dyadic competitive interactions between organizations, when one 
organization is represented by a former employee of the other, the latter can undermine the former 
by engaging its own resources according to the residual knowledge held about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the former employee such that the employee’s productive inputs are not as effective 
as they would be against other competitors (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014). If an organization’s actions 
sufficiently degrade the productivity of their former employee, relative to their value in 
competition against other competitors, it may result in a strategic weakness or liability for the 
employee’s current organization (Arend, 2004; Sirmon et al., 2010; West & DeCastro, 2001). If 
this disadvantage is realized only in direct competition against the employee’s former organization, 
being the holder of asymmetric information might undermine the employee’s effectiveness, 
enabling the former organization to achieve superior performance against its former employee over 
the entire field of competitors who lack the benefit of the former organization’s residual knowledge 
(Powell, 2001). This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1A. Ceteris paribus, an organization will achieve superior performance against 
the organization represented by its former employee. 
The organization-specific knowledge of employees can be an important isolating 
mechanism contributing to persistent superior performance (Coff, 1997). As such, during their 
tenure with an organization, employees may be required to make human capital investments in 
becoming familiar with the organization’s key resources and routines (Wang et al., 2009).  
Through these investments, employees may receive access to privileged information regarding the 
organization’s resources, routines, and other stocks of knowledge that the organization is 
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incentivized to protect from leakage to competitors (Barney, 1986; Franco & Filson, 2006; 
Liebeskind, 1997; Song et al., 2003). The information available to employees due to their insider 
status can be a means of appropriating value when that information contains hidden information 
pertaining to how that value was created (Wright, Coff, & Moliterno, 2014), including, for 
example, the organization’s routines. Organizational routines are “Regular and predictable 
behavior patterns of firms” (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p.14). When organizations have a set of 
superior routines that are key to their superior performance, the tacit understanding of these 
routines are embedded in their employees (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011).  
Organizations have been characterized as social communities that specialize in the creation 
and transfer of knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1993). Facilitating the intraorganizational creation 
and exchange of knowledge requires social capital such as shared knowledge (Nahapiet & 
Ghoshal, 1998). Thus, in addition to their knowledge of routines, former employees may also have 
knowledge of the specific human capital resources held by their former organization, including 
those that might be deployed against them in subsequent representative competition. To illustrate, 
in the MLB context, an organization’s employees, both hitters and pitchers, are afforded a high 
degree of opportunity for informal interaction through the sharing of facilities and the downtime 
involved in the day-to-day existence of baseball players over a 162-game season (Gamboa & 
Russell, 2018; Will, 1990). As players within an organization share a common objective of 
achieving team-level success, their interactions are likely to involve, at least in part, performance-
related discussion that may be intended to remain private and therefore not for disclosure to 
competitors. Further, while batters do not compete directly against pitchers on their team in formal 
competition, they share time in practice and training where each will work on improving their 
strengths and addressing weaknesses (Gamboa & Russell, 2018).  
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When these employees leave to join competitors, the private information about the 
organization moves with them. When former employees are engaged in direct competition against 
their former organization, the employee’s stock of asymmetric information, which can include 
familiarity with the opposition’s routines and/or personnel (Aime et al., 2010), should provide 
them with a performance advantage relative to when they compete against organizations for which 
they must use publicly available information to search for an advantage. This reasoning leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1B. Ceteris paribus, an organization will have a relative performance discount 
against the organization represented by its former employee. 
Data Analytics: Reducing Information Asymmetries from Residual Knowledge 
Along with strategic withholding of information from external parties, a key antecedent of 
information asymmetry is the existence of structural barriers to information diffusion in an industry 
or competitive context (Bergh et al., 2019). As organizations are incentivized to develop and 
exploit information asymmetries to achieve superior performance, the competition is incentivized 
to make investments intended to reduce such asymmetric information (Bergh et al., 2019). Access 
to information might be impeded by shortcomings in technology to collect and interpret 
information that is otherwise observable and unprotected. When these structural barriers are 
degraded through technological innovation, information asymmetries erode along with the 
advantage they provide. 
Technological innovation and the evolution of organizations and management have been 
linked throughout history (Chandler, 1977; Rosenberg, 1982).  According to Rogers (1962), the 
adoption of innovative technology by an organization occurs through a five-stage process: 
Awareness takes place when an organization is first exposed to the technology, followed by 
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persuasion when interested decision-makers pursue more information, then a decision is made to 
adopt or reject the innovation, adopting organizations then implement the innovation to varying 
degrees as a pilot to determine its usefulness, and finally confirmation of the decision to adopt 
leads to continuous investment in the technology. 
As it has become increasingly more powerful and sophisticated, the adoption of 
information technology has provided value to organizations by enabling them to operate more 
efficiently  (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1995, 1996; Devaraj & Kohli, 2003; Dewan & Min, 1997). A 
specific type of revolution in information technology, data analytics, has served to address the 
problem identified by Simon (1982) and extended by Ocasio (1997) of an overabundance of 
information and a scarcity of the attention and processing power to absorb it. The ever-increasing 
presence of analytics and data-driven decision-making across society, from business and politics 
to sports, signals a revolutionary change in the role of the modern worker and manager (Barbier & 
Liu, 2011; Brynjolfsson & McElheran, 2016; Brynjolfsson & Mitchell, 2017; Davenport, 2014). 
Analytics are generally defined as “The extensive use of data, statistical and quantitative analysis, 
explanatory and predictive models, and fact-based management to drive decisions and actions.” 
(Harris & Davenport, 2007, p.7) Analytics are a set of tools for collecting and analyzing immense 
sets of data to create predictive models of the outcomes of potential solutions for a problem (Bose, 
2009). Analytics can be used to inform decisions across the organization related to many activities, 
including personnel and hiring decisions (Elfenbein & Sterling, 2018). Analytics can complement 
existing managerial capital by enhancing their sensing and pattern recognition capabilities (Chi, 
Ravichandran, & Andrevski, 2010). Managers may then apply the recommendations generated by 
the organization’s analytics capability when making decisions, or, alternatively, “Analytics may 
drive fully automated decisions” (Harris & Davenport, 2007, p.2). 
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Organizations apply their analytics capabilities to the external environment in the pursuit 
of competitive intelligence, the actionable intelligence that provides an advantage over competitors 
(Kahaner, 1996). For example, organizations have applied their analytics capabilities to mining 
and analyzing publicly available data from social media, blogs, online reports, emails and 
webpages to monitor their competitors and better understand and cater to their own customer base 
(He, Wu, Yan, Akula, & Shen, 2015).  
As such, an organization’s adoption of an analytics capability and the pursuit of 
competitive intelligence relates directly to the strategic factor market literature’s discussion of 
internal and external searches for informational advantage. According to Barney’s (1986) seminal 
work on SFM, searches conducted in the external environment are not as likely as internal searches 
to yield informational advantages due to the non-exclusive nature of information obtained 
externally. Yet, given the premia associated with information (especially private information), it 
is likely that most organizations will have to rely only on publicly available information when 
assessing the value of resources in the SFM. Using superior technology and/or human capital 
purchased on the SFM, an organization can use publicly available information to develop more 
accurate representations of the value of resources than its fellow organizations without privileged 
information about those resources, thereby achieving superior performance (Barney & Clark, 
2007).  
This advantage may also extend over organizations that benefit from holding private 
information about their competitors. An organization’s private information can result in superior 
performance so long as its competitors would have made different decisions if they were also privy 
to the private information (Bergh et al., 2019; Connelly et al., 2011). If, instead, an organization’s 
decisions that were informed by its analytical capabilities would not have changed with the benefit 
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of another organization’s private information, then the latter may not realize an advantage over the 
former through their holding of private information.  
As such, differentiation among organizations with regard to their adoption and innovation 
of an analytics capability can be a source of, at least temporary, superior performance (Aral & 
Weill, 2007; Ray, Barney, & Muhanna, 2004; Swanson, 1994). As an organization’s competitors 
become aware of the advantages they receive from their analytics capability, they will attempt to 
adopt the capability by purchasing the technological resources available on the strategic factor 
market (Rogers, 1962; Wade & Hulland, 2004). As adoption increases, the advantage gained by 
early adopters of analytics erodes as the capability transforms from a strategic to a tactical resource 
that is necessary to achieve a position of parity (Barney & Clark, 2007; Warnier et al., 2013).   
An organization’s decision to invest in an analytics capability could be interpreted as their 
pursuit of superior abilities in capturing and analyzing publicly available information in the 
external environment. The resource-based view predicts that information technology by itself is 
only capable of providing temporary superior performance, as the computational resources needed 
are available to other organizations in the market (Barney & Clark, 2007; Powell & Dent-Micallef, 
1997). However, the role of heterogeneous and complementary human capital used in concert with 
an organization’s analytics capability may provide superior performance as it is more difficult for 
competitors to recreate (Barney, Wright, & Ketchen, 2001; Peteraf, 1993; Powell & Dent-Micallef, 
1997). 
For an organization, the ability to compete better against their former employees than all 
other competitors in the field represents a distinct competence that is costly to imitate. However, 
distinct competences that are difficult to imitate may be subject to threat of substitution from 
competitors incentivized to invest in innovation (Konlechner & Ambrosini, 2019; McEvily, Das, 
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& McCabe, 2000). Similar to the introduction of automated production, an organization’s analytics 
capability may substitute for existing resources within the organization depending on the degree 
to which existing resources complement the newly introduced technology (Autor, Levy, & 
Murnane, 2003; Dewan & Min, 1997). When the information provided by analytics is used in 
combination with current organizational knowledge to create better informed decisions, then 
substitution of current organizational knowledge may not occur (Autor et al., 2003; Tambe, 2014). 
However, information generated by analytics that is identical or superior to that of current 
organizational knowledge may render the latter redundant.    
If the information generated by an organization’s analytics capability is of a sufficiently 
high quality, then the value of an organization’s residual knowledge about their former employees 
may be diminished. An organization’s analytics capability can thus erode the value of residual 
knowledge in two ways – either the private knowledge is duplicated by other teams reaching 
similar insights, or the information provided by an organization’s analytics is superior to the 
residual knowledge for devaluing a given employee. In either case, the superior performance 
enjoyed by the former organization’s private knowledge of the employee will be diluted as other 
competitors also learn to compete better against the employee. This reasoning leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Ceteris paribus, the adoption of analytics in an industry will negatively 
moderate the organization's performance advantage over their former employee in direct 





The Effect of Management Quality 
“It depends on the manager.” 
Cardinals First Baseman Bill White, in response to the question, “How much 
difference does a manager make?” (Koppett, 1967, p.83) 
“You observe a lot by watching.” 
Hall of Fame Catcher Yogi Berra, on why he thought he would be a good manager 
(Pepe, 1974, p.185)  
In the pursuit of superior performance, organizations should focus their resources in 
scenarios where they will have the greatest advantage relative to their competitors (Wernerfelt & 
Karnani, 1987). An organization’s managerial capital is distinguished from its other resources in 
that managerial capital is specifically dedicated to the coordination of the firm’s collective 
resources towards that focusing effort (Castanias & Helfat, 1991, 2001; Penrose, 1959). As the 
KSAOs of management are heterogeneous across organizations, they can potentially represent a 
source of superior performance for the organization (Helfat & Martin, 2015; Levenson et al., 2006; 
Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Penrose (1959, p.5) states that, “The experience of management will 
affect the productive services that all its resources are capable of rendering.” 
In their responsibility for making decisions regarding the focused deployment of resources, 
including human capital, an organization’s managers can have a complementary effect on its 
individual-level human capital (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; Holcomb et al., 2009; Sirmon et al., 
2008). Therefore, a key determinant of individual-level performance of employees within an 
organization is the nature of their deployment as determined by management. It is thus incumbent 
on the management of an organization, in assigning employees to various tasks, that they endeavor 
to better understand each individual’s skill set, in which contexts the employee is most likely to be 
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successful, and in which contexts they would be setting them up to fail (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; 
Sirmon et al., 2008). Developing this knowledge may require extensive learning-by-doing over 
time (Katz, 1955; Shamsie & Mannor, 2013). It is through persistent investment that organizations 
develop knowledge dedicated to enhancing the potential of their internal resources (Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989). 
Individual-level deployment decisions are made at the unit-level by the organization’s 
management (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014). An organization’s management consists of both the 
executive level decision-makers and the mid-level managers who coordinate the resources under 
their immediate control towards executing the strategy formulated at the top-level (Carpenter, 
Geletkancz, & Sanders, 2004; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Taylor & Helfat, 2008). Effectively 
managing an organization’s resources requires that management possesses the necessary set of 
knowledge and skills to do so (Holcomb et al., 2009; Sirmon et al., 2011). This relevant knowledge 
must develop through experience. Thus, the quality of managers can be, in part, a function of the 
service time they accumulate in their specific role (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; Shamsie & Mannor, 
2013). By virtue of their frequent interactions with the organization’s key resources under their 
direct control, an organization’s mid-level managers tend to have a greater depth of knowledge of 
these resources than the executive-level managers setting the strategic agenda (Ecker et al., 2013; 
Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Wooldridge et al., 2008). 
In the baseball context, field managers are functionally more akin to middle-managers than 
executives, who analogue closer to the general manager and other front-office personnel (Sirmon 
et al., 2008). An important trait of successful field managers is, “…the ability to recognize, 
instantaneously, all or most of the relevant factors in game situations, not just a few…the real trick 
is to define the situation correctly by taking into account all the contingencies,” (Koppett, 1967, 
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pp. 95–96). Koppett elaborates, “Some managers…are so sharp at making split-second decisions 
during a game that their players (and rivals) become convinced that this quickness turns half a 
dozen imminent defeats into victories. (Manager) Leo Durocher earned that reputation” (1967, 
p.84). Managers can be called upon to make effective quick decisions in high-velocity 
environments (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the managerial cognition literature, the importance of 
manager pattern-recognition through knowledge specific to a given context for managers is 
discussed by Helfat and Peteraf, “Although subjective prior beliefs may distort perceptions, 
particularly when information is ambiguous, context-specific knowledge and experience in pattern 
recognition may provide a mitigating factor” (2015, p.838). When a manager has more in-depth 
knowledge of a context, they should be able to create more accurate representations of the situation 
than would managers lacking that knowledge (Csaszar & Levinthal, 2016).  
In including factors directly related to performance, information asymmetries stemming 
from an organization’s residual knowledge of former employees is a potential source of advantage 
in subsequent representative competition. However, the presence of information asymmetries is 
not sufficient to provide an organization with superior performance. For such an outcome, an 
organization’s asymmetric information requires complementary resources in the cognitive abilities 
of management to apply the asymmetric information to an actionable plan and then deploy the 
requisite resources accordingly (Makadok, 2001). Therefore, managers with superior KSAOs can 
utilize asymmetric information, muster appropriate resources, and develop and execute an 
exploitative plan better than their counterparts. This reasoning leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3. Ceteris paribus, the quality of an organization's management will positively 
moderate the organization's performance advantage over their former employee in direct 





The Effect of Employee Quality 
The employee mobility literature and the organizational knowledge literature converge 
around the recognition that organizational knowledge exiting employees take with them may lead 
to the undermining of the former organization’s technology-based superior performance should 
that knowledge spill over to its competitors (Agarwal et al., 2009; Campbell et al., 2012). The 
literature acknowledges heterogeneity in the levels of knowledge employees may possess, and 
differentiates between employees by their relative quality (Becker, 1964). So-called “star” 
employees are defined by their high levels of productivity as compared to colleagues in their firm 
and field (Groysberg et al., 2008; Wright et al., 2014). Some attributes of stars include excellence 
in the performance of the core tasks of their job (Kehoe, Lepak, & Bentley, 2018), the ability to 
seek out and obtain the internal and external resources necessary to perpetuate performance 
(Allison, Long, & Krauze, 1982), and an abundance of external and internal social capital (Burt, 
1992; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Oldroyd & Morris, 2012).  
Employees boasting the “star” status can have a uniquely negative impact on their 
organization when they leave for a competitor, requiring a reconfiguration and influx of new 
resources to try to replace the lost capital (Groysberg et al., 2008; Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014). 
Because of their potential to create value, their status, and their internal social capital (Fonti & 
Maoret, 2016; Groysberg & Lee, 2009; Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014), star employees may be more 
likely to have been granted access to the organization’s key strategic resources (Oldroyd & Morris, 
2012). Thus, star employees are more likely to possess knowledge key to the superior performance 
of the organization. In addition, the resourcefulness attributed to higher quality employees (Allison 
et al., 1982), may enable them to better exploit their private information when compared to their 
lower quality counterparts.  
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Because of the high likelihood that they will have privileged access to key resources and 
greater ability to retain and recall valuable knowledge and recognize opportunities to apply it in 
the future, “star” employees, being of a higher relative quality, will be better able to leverage their 
asymmetric information to gain an advantage when their current organization engages in 
representative competition against their former organization. This reasoning leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. Ceteris paribus, the quality of the former employee will negatively moderate 
the organization's performance advantage over the former employee in direct competition 
with the employee's current organization, relative to other competitor organizations. 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
The sample for this study consists of matchups between MLB players and their former 
teams from the 1986-2018 seasons. The population is limited to position players and not pitchers, 
for several reasons. The first reason is due to the relative difference in isolating individual 
contributions between pitchers, whose performance is interdependent with the fielders supporting 
them, and batters, who matchup against the opposing side alone in delimited at-bats with clearly 
measurable outcomes (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; Humphrey, Morgeson, & Mannor, 2009). The 
second reason is due to the nature of how pitchers participate in a given season. Unlike batters, a 
starting pitcher is only expected to appear once every five games or so. Thus, opportunities to 
compete against their former teams are limited to at most once for every series of games played. 
In addition, while batters often participate in an entire game even if they fail each time they reach 
the plate, poorly performing pitchers may be removed rather quickly, further limiting the 
opportunity to observe performance. Third, the specter of influence from a player’s manager is 
relatively more pronounced for pitchers than batters. Managers can call for the pitcher to 
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intentionally walk a batter intentionally or “pitch around” a batter,6 both of which count against 
the pitcher’s performance. When batters receive instructions from their manager, such as executing 
a hit and run, it is still largely up to the batter to execute by making contact. A batter’s performance 
is further isolated from manager-decision making due to the removal of sacrifice hits from 
consideration of a batter’s performance.   
Several criteria must be met for a batter’s season to be included in the sample. This study 
includes matchups against a former team among only those batters who qualify for the batting title 
in that season. To qualify for a batting title, a batter must record at least 3.1 plate appearances per 
team game played, roughly constituting 500 at bats, in a given full season.7 While this is a rather 
arbitrary figure for our purposes, it ensures a large sample of at-bats over the season and, in all 
likelihood, against their former team as well. The strike-shortened season of 1994 is excluded from 
the sample due to sample size concerns. Because of these criteria, it may be the case that a player 
can be included in the sample in one season but excluded the next if the player fails to meet the 
required number of plate appearances. Though the first season of our sample is 1986, we go back 
to 1980 for the purposes of determining a player’s former teams. Adhering to these criteria yields 
a sample size of 2,940 observed matchups between players and their former teams.  
Data were collected from several different sources and assembled into one dataset. The 
primary source of data on player performance was Baseball-Reference.com. Data on managerial 
performance were collected from BaseballProspectus.com. Data on player transactions were 
 
6 Similar to an intentional walk, pitching around a batter means the pitcher intends to throw no strikes to a batter, 
sometimes leading to them striking out, but more often leading to a walk that is not formally designated in the pitcher’s 
performance record as intentional. 
 
7 Major League Baseball teams are scheduled to play 162 games per season, however various circumstances can lead 
to postponements of games with the intent to play them at a later date. On occasion, makeup games are logistically 
challenging to facilitate and may not have implications for determining postseason seeding. In these cases, the league 




collected from a combination of the websites retrosheet.org and SeanLahman.com. Data on player 
salaries were collected from the website of Doug Pappas of SABR, but ultimately not included in 
the model. 
Data for the adoption of analytics measures were collected from media guides of MLB 
teams. Media guides of the front office directories for all 30 teams from 2004-2016 were scanned 
at the Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown, New York. From these scans, a dataset was coded 
with the names, job titles, and departments of employees related to baseball operations. This 
dataset was further coded by an indicator for whether an employee’s job title included language 
related to analytics activity. An additional indicator was created for whether an analytics-related 
employee worked in an organization before under a different job title, and/or whether the employee 
was promoted to a position in the organization that removed analytics-specific language from their 
title, but the continued application of analytics in their supervisory role is assumed. Employment 
prior to formal titling may be indicative of the presence (or potential presence) of analytics related 
KSAOs in the employee, though not necessarily the requirements of analytics capabilities in the 
tasks their organization assigns them.8 Further, early adopters may intentionally keep their 
programs small in the initial stages of widespread adoption when the marginal benefit between 
organizations using analytics and those not is relative greater. Organizations who may be 
incentivized to keep a low profile on their analytics operations may classify their analytics 
employees under a more general job title (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2014). A graph showing the 
progression of teams hiring their first formally titled analytics employees is found in Figure 1. 
  
 
8 This view seems consistent with the Ghoshal and Westney (1991) discussion of a two-pronged approach for staffing 





Performance. The dependent variable is the performance of Major League Baseball 
players (specifically batters) when competing directly against their former organizations as 
compared to their performance when competing against all teams in the league in a given season. 
This batting performance is measured using a statistic called “Split-adjusted on-base percentage 
plus slugging”, abbreviated as tOPS+, which, as will be explained, serves as a suitable proxy for a 
player’s batting performance.  
The measure at the root of the tOPS+ statistic is OPS (i.e. on-base plus slugging), which 
has been widely accepted within the sport as a measure for a player’s productivity with respect to 
the batting component of baseball (Thorn & Palmer, 1984). The aggregated OPS measure of a 
team is, at .946, highly correlated to the total number of runs the team scores, the key determinant 
of offensive performance (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2014).  
OPS is composed of a sum of two performance measures, on-base percentage and slugging. 
The first component of OPS, On-base percentage (OBP), is a measure of how often the player 
reaches base via a hit, walk, or hit-by-pitch over their plate appearances. OBP can also be framed 
as how frequently a player avoids negative outcomes for their team when they are at bat. The 
second component, slugging, measures the number of bases a player achieves through hits over 
their total at-bats (plate appearances not including walks and hit-by-pitch). Slugging gives more 
weight to extra-base hits, which are more contributive to scoring and, typically, more difficult to 
achieve than singles. OBP and slugging, when combined in OPS, reflect how well a player 
balances getting the most productive hits and the resulting increased risk of recording an out that 
this effort entails.  
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The “+” in the OPS+ statistic represents adjustments that have been made to the OPS 
measure to account for the differences in ballparks across the league. Some parks are significantly 
more favorable to offense or defense, and the adjustment in the measure accounts for this potential 
bias. Finally, the “t” in the tOPS+ measure is a customized version of the OPS+ statistic that 
represents a player’s performance against one organization relative to their average performance 
against all organizations in a given season.  
The tOPS+ measure does not account for some traditional measures of performance such 
as Runs-Batted-In (RBIs), as we are concerned with the performance of the individual player in 
isolation instead of performance that is dependent on the contributions of others on that player’s 
team. As Yogi Berra put it when asked how he was able to drive in 23 runs in a doubleheader in 
the minor leagues: “Every time I came to bat, there were men on base” (Pepe, 1974, p.187). 
Independent Variables 
Baseball Analytics Era. Analytics in a professional sports organizational context is defined 
as “The management of structured historical data, the application of predictive analytic models 
that utilize that data, and the use of information systems to inform decision makers and enable 
them to help their organizations in gaining a superior performance on the field of play” (Alamar 
& Mehrotra, 2011). An analytics capability in a baseball organization would consist of at least one 
full-time employee dedicated to this effort, along with an investment in the hardware and software 
necessary to facilitate their work (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2014).  
Baseball organizations and managers have historically ranged from overzealous to 
antipathetic regarding the utility of in-depth statistical analysis for on-field management (Francona 
& Shaughnessy, 2013; Martin & Golenbock, 1980; Shanks, 2005). Recounting his time as a scout 
with the Cardinals, former Astros General Manager said “In 2003, there were maybe four to five 
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clubs that had analytics-dedicated people on their payroll, and typically they were in an office 
down the hall working on recommendations to people who may or may not pay any attention” 
(Luhnow, 2018). 
In 2004, however, a watershed moment brought to light the potential benefits of an 
analytics-driven decision-making and forced every organization in the league to confront the 
“Sabermetrics” movement that was permeating baseball. Prior to the start of the 2004 season, a 
book was published detailing how the Oakland Athletics had incorporated advanced statistical 
analysis for informing decisions at all levels of the organization through the context of their highly 
successful 2002 season despite sporting a payroll near the bottom of the league. The book, 
Moneyball (Lewis, 2004) spent twenty weeks on the New York Times Bestseller List, selling over 
a million copies, as well as prompting a 2011 film adaptation that collected $120 million at the 
box office. The book was “A significant catalyst in spreading the sabermetric gospel in baseball 
front offices” (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2014, p.1), and ushered in the “sabermetrics era” of teams 
adopting and investing in the analytical capabilities of their front offices en masse, hoping to 
recreate the Oakland model of great on-field success at a low cost (Futterman, 2011). 
Sabermetrics found supporters even among noted conservatives such as George Will, “It’s 
about how to price assets, and that’s something that’s germane whether you’re running Chrysler 
or Goldman Sachs or the Oakland A’s” (Futterman, 2011). Field managers, such as Terry Francona 
of the Red Sox, also were coming around to the merits of advanced analytics “’It wasn’t just 
numbers,’ said Francona. “There was a lot of stuff about ‘types’ of pitchers and how a certain type 
of pitcher would be good against a certain type of hitter. It was interesting. We had talked about it 
all during the interview. I think maybe (previous manager Grady Little) wasn’t interested, but I 
wanted the information. It was stuff that I used.’” (Francona & Shaughnessy, 2013, p.80). 
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Following Moneyball’s publication in 2004, the technology related to the measurement, 
dissemination, collection, and analysis of mass amounts of data advanced quickly – leading to the 
quantification of data that had previously only been able to be collected qualitatively (Baumer & 
Zimbalist, 2014; Keri, 2011; Lehman, 2013; Lindbergh & Miller, 2016; Sawchik, 2015). For 
example, two years after the publication of Moneyball, the PITCHf/x system debuted that provided 
detailed information on the position, velocity, and acceleration of every pitched baseball in three 
dimensions, providing rich and accurate data on pitching that was previously measured through 
combining quantified measures from the use of radar guns and the subjective qualitative 
assessment of scouts (Fast, 2010). 
While the awareness of the use of analytics to inform decision-making was ubiquitous 
following the publication of Moneyball, actual implementation and confirmation of analytics-
driven processes was more gradual and not uniform across organizations. From Luhnow (2018), 
“There are hundreds of people that work in a baseball organization, including coaches, scouts, and 
hundreds of players that are signed at any one point in time. They did not accept it right away. For 
certain elements of the analytics, we had to wait and be patient. Because if you can’t get the 
coaches and the players to buy into it, it’s not going to happen.” Once the choice was made to 
develop an analytics capability, developing an analytics driven decision-making organizational 
culture could take years (Alamar, 2013; Baumer, 2015). Organizations that were skeptical of the 
potential for analytics to provide superior performance were hesitant to commit the necessary 
investments to bring all necessary components, from data collection and storage architecture to 
analysis and recommendations within the organizational hierarchy (Luhnow, 2018).  
To examine the effects of the mass awareness of analytics-driven decision-making on 
organizational performance against former players, I use a binary indicator for whether the 
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observed season matchup took place after the publication of the book Moneyball before the 2004 
season. For this rationale, Baumer and Zimbalist wrote, regarding analytics-based front-office 
employees, “It can be no coincidence that most of these people have been hired since the 
publication of Moneyball, and, in some cases, the connection is directly causal” (2014. p.25).  
While the binary measure accurately proxies for the mass awareness of analytics, it does 
not tell us much about the other key stages of technology adoption developed by Rogers (1962), 
nor the activities of individual organizations. Further measures could be used to examine 
implementation and confirmation of adoption. The published media guides of each organization 
afford an opportunity for a measure of these stages for individual organizations based on 
substantive commitments to analytics in hiring practices. Two additional measures are used to 
proxy the effects of analytics adoption more robustly by examining the implementation and 
confirmation stages respectively. 
Analytics Expertise. This measure is based on the first season in which an organization 
explicitly features an analytics related job title for one of their baseball operations employees. It is 
a percentage of teams that reach or have previously reached the implementation stage in a given 
season.  
Analytics Experience. The initial adoption of analytics through the hiring of dedicated 
personnel is an essential step towards becoming what Davenport (2006) terms an “Analytics 
Competitor,” however the leap between having a quant on the payroll running basic analysis and 
having a robust analytics capability inform key decisions made throughout the organization 
requires advocates to drive focused investments and cultural adaptation over time (Alamar, 2013; 
Harris & Davenport, 2007). This measure looks at the intensity of investment in analytics 
capabilities across the league and is the ratio of total analytics employees over the total number of 
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teams that have reached the implementation stage, weighted by the logged number of years since 
an organization first hired an analytics-related employee.   
Manager Quality.  
“Managing has become a specialized field. A lot of things have become specialized…He can’t 
afford to make mistakes. He knows the contours of the fence in every park; he knows which 
outfielders have go the good arms and which ones you can run on; he knows his own runners, 
which ones he can send home and which ones he’d better stop, given the circumstances. It’s a 
science all in itself, and to put the extra responsibility on yourself, if you’re managing, takes away 
from your efficiency.” 
- Bobby Bragan, from (Honig, 1977) 
John McGraw, Casey Stengel, Earl Weaver, and Tony La Russa, regarded as some of the 
greatest and most impactful managers in baseball history (Jaffe, 2010; James, 1997; Koppett, 
2000), all understood that on-field success was achieved through a combination of featuring 
players in situations where they are likely to perform well while shielding players from situations 
where they are likely to fail (Morris, 2006; Nuwer, 1988). Managers who follow the conventional 
wisdom would only be obliged to evaluate their players (or just follow the consensus evaluation 
of the scouting department) according to the ideal attributes for each position, then repeat that 
same lineup for every game (Freeze, 1974; Koppett, 1967). However, it is the relentless pursuit of 
knowledge that can lead to superior performance that is a recognized hallmark of good baseball 
managers (Feldmann, 2018; Francona & Shaughnessy, 2013; Keri, 2011; Koppett, 2000; Sawchik, 
2015; Will, 1990). According to former field manager Paul Richards, “Everything that happens on 
the field during the course of the game is either something good for the manager or something bad. 




Though also adhering to established conventions suggested by the codified knowledge 
available to them, baseball managers often speak of hunches, instincts, and gut feelings that 
determine the decisions they make (Anderson, 1984; Bissinger, 2005; Gamboa & Russell, 2018; 
Kennedy, 1983; Shanks, 2005); they cannot necessarily follow the exact reasoning behind all the 
decisions they make but are nonetheless unshakeable in the rightness of their calls (Jaffe, 2010; 
Koppett, 2000; Will, 1990). Casey Stengel, while helping to institutionalize the playing the 
percentages approach to setting his lineups, was also not afraid to defy this approach if his instincts 
told him to, saying “People alter percentages” (Nuwer, 1988). Similarly, La Russa believes that 
human nature dictates results and that his role as a manager is to recognize the impact of human 
nature and take the best advantage of it (Bissinger, 2005). Though he respects the advice of 
statisticians, Terry Francona has no reservations about ignoring the numbers if he feels strongly 
that a player needs the confidence boost that comes from starting a game for the sake of their 
season (Francona & Shaughnessy, 2013). Even when managers cannot explicate the rationale 
behind their decisions in the moment or, indeed even in retrospect, their decisions are still 
grounded in knowledge that is aggregated over their many years of experience (Francona & 
Shaughnessy, 2013; Koppett, 2000; Sawchik, 2015; Will, 1990). Though a careful, scientific 
approach of the collection, analysis and interpretation of raw data to inform a manager’s decisions 
can be important, the act of managing a baseball team itself has as much to do with art (Cook, 
1964; Wheeler, 2015). As Koppett puts it, “(The manager) must know who has to be pushed, to be 
encouraged, who can take criticism, who can’t who needs help and who can’t be helped – all 
without turning into a baby-sitter or a tyrant, or an unapproachable autocrat, or a friendly buttinski” 
(1967, p.88).  
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Proxying for the quality of a manager is a measure adapted from its use in previous 
management studies in the sports context known as a manager’s “Dirk’s Ability” or their adjusted 
career winning percentage (Crocker & Eckardt, 2014; Holcomb et al., 2009). This measure is 
derived by taking a manager’s career winning percentage and assigning weight by their total 
number of coaching years, thus building in a premium for consistently good performance over a 
long time-period. To account for the gradual development of managerial capital, the denominator 
of total number of coaching years is taken at the point in time of the observation, not cumulatively 
over the manager’s career, which is represented by the following formula. 
𝐴𝑊𝑃 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 ∗ [1 − (
1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑎𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
)]  
Using season-level observations presented issues with regard to the manager ability 
measure. In the context of MLB, managers are routinely made to be the scapegoat for their team’s 
poor performance and can be fired at any point during or after a season (Gamson & Scotch, 1964). 
In the case of a mid-season firing of a manager, we cannot be certain that the player is competing 
against the manager who started the season or his replacement. To address this issue, we impute 
the managerial ability of the former team as being a sum of the manager ability of all managers in 
the given season, weighted by the percentage of games that each served as the manager. 
Player Quality. In baseball, a common nomenclature used when scouting players regards 
their “tools” and how they are evaluated. A player’s tools are their physical prowess in undertaking 
the five primary activities essential for baseball success: hitting for average, hitting for power, 
running the bases, fielding their position, and throwing the ball (Thorn & Palmer, 1984). Players 
vary widely in their respective skills for accomplishing each activity – some may be decently 
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competent at each, some may specialize in one or a few9, while those players who excel in all 
areas, the “five-tool player”, are extremely rare and are valued as the stars that they are (Bissinger, 
2005; Keri, 2011; Lewis, 2004). While professional players vary widely in the caliber of their 
respective tools, a near certainty for all players is that their tools will begin to decline at some point 
in their career as a natural function of aging. Players who fail to adjust to the downgrade in the 
resources available to them to accomplish their work tasks will see their performance decline and 
risk losing their job to younger players with sharper tools. Veteran players with declining physical 
tools can potentially avoid a decline in their performance by tapping the base of knowledge and 
experience they have accumulated during their career to discover new opportunities for superior 
performance. By matching or surpassing their previous productivity through competing smarter 
(not harder) players can extend their careers.  
The knowledge a player can draw upon to inform his approach represents the whole of 
experience accumulated over the course of their career. Veteran players who supplement their 
declining physical tools with a better-informed approach may be more capable of parsing through 
noise to identify and extract valuable information. They may also be more capable of internalizing 
valuable information into their personal base of knowledge, then recognizing when a situation 
emerges where applying that knowledge may lead to superior performance.     
As a player’s health inevitably decline over a long career due to the effects of age and 
injury, the player will need to rely more and more on their experience and knowledge to 
supplement their deteriorating physical skills (Honig, 1977). Giving weight to consistently good 
performance over time, including the period after a player’s physical skills are likely to have 
 
9 Pitchers, for example, are expected to be exemplary at throwing the baseball to batters, while it may be acceptable 
that they are worse than the average person off the street at the other aspects of the game such as batting. 
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declined, is meant to account for a player’s successful substitution of their physical abilities with 
their accumulated knowledge.  
Thus, a similar approach is taken to measuring player quality as the approach for measuring 
manager quality, as the player’s career quality measure is intended to reward good performance 
over a sustained period. By weighting in this manner, players can be distinguished by three 
different types. Players with long careers who relied mostly on their fielding and running tools 
would have lower measures here. Similarly, players who were successful hitters early in their 
careers but were unable to sustain it by adjusting to a more cerebral approach when their physical 
abilities declined will also have lower measures. The higher quality players that are theorized to 
best utilize their stock of private information against their former organizations will have higher 
scores than their counterparts. 
The measure is derived by taking the player’s career OPS weighted by the total number of 
seasons they played on an active MLB roster, as represented by the following formula. 
𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐶𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑂𝑃𝑆 ∗ [1 − (
1
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑
)]  
Controls 
League-wide tOPS+. One reason a given player may perform poorly against his former 
organization may be that every player in the league performs poorly against the organization. 
Whether the focal organization has superior pitching, defense, or some combination of both, the 
relative quality of the opposing team would be a clear confound to explaining the variance in 
performance against an opposing team and the rest of the league. This factor is addressed using 
the organization’s league-wide tOPS+. The league-wide tOPS+ is composed of the same measures 
as the dependent variable, but, instead of looking at one particular player-team matchup, this 
variable is cumulative of every batter who competes against a given team during a given season. 
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Focal Season OPS. The tOPS+ statistic that measures the dependent variable is relative of 
the player’s overall performance. If a player is having a singularly great season, a performance 
that would be considered acceptable for all other players against a given opponent may 
nevertheless result in a poor tOPS score. Likewise, a player having a terrible season overall that 
gets one or two extra base hits may end up with an inflated tOPS score. The player’s OPS statistic 
for the season controls for the influence that extremes in the quality of a player’s season may have 
on the dependent variable.   
Pre-mobility Player Tenure. Numerous factors can develop during the player’s time with 
the former organization that can affect future competition. At an emotional level, players may 
come to incorporate their team as part of their identity, and react negatively if they feel slighted by 
them in an exit event (Jackson, Buglione, & Glenwick, 1988; Kopelman & Pantaleno, 1977; 
Tewksbury & Miller, 2018). In terms of the development of knowledge, a key driver of improved 
performance at the individual and team levels is increasing cumulative experience (Huckman, 
Staats, & Upton, 2009; Wright, 1936). The development of knowledge is subject to time-
compression diseconomies (Dierickx & Cool, 1989) where declining amounts of time reduces the 
experienced returns of a given investment. 
Specific to the MLB context, baseball players are notoriously partial to undergoing 
extended periods of unusual performance, both negative “slumps” and positive “hot streaks” 
(Anderson, 1984; Tango, Lichtman, & Dolphin, 2007; Thorn & Palmer, 1984). As such, it may be 
difficult for organizations to avoid drawing specious conclusions about a player if the time-period 
of control is brief. The likelihood that a more accurate and holistic representation of the player 
emerges should therefore increase with the duration of the tenure period. Likewise, for players, 
meaningful and private knowledge of the personnel and routines of an organization may require 
66 
 
numerous opportunities to accumulate. The longer a player is under the control of an organization, 
the more chances that the organization and the player will have to develop knowledge that may be 
relevant and actionable in competition subsequent to the player’s exit. In other words, with more 
exclusive access to information should come more knowledge that is valuable.  
Duration of player tenure is thus measured by the number of full and partial seasons a 
player spent with their former team before playing against them as a member of a competing team. 
As the returns to learning diminish over time and may even become negative due to knowledge 
ossification (Berman et al., 2002), the variable is logged to reflect diminishing marginal returns to 
learning. 
Post-mobility Lag. Successful baseball players often adapt their approach to counter 
changes in their opponent’s approach to them. Therefore, the knowledge a team holds concerning 
their former player must adapt as well to remain relevant (Weaver & Pluto, 1984). The likelihood 
that a representation formed about a player during their tenure period will remain an accurate 
representation of that player in subsequent competition will thus decrease as the time between the 
end of the tenure period and the subsequent competition increases. Likewise, season-to-season 
changes in organizations, including player and managerial personnel, occur quite often.  To control 
for changes in players and organizations over time, a count is used of the number of seasons 
between the end of a player’s tenure with a given team and the observed player performance as 
measured by the difference in the ages of the player at each point in time. As any effects from a 
change in players or organizations are unlikely to accumulate linearly, the variable is logged in the 
model.   
Involuntary exit. As discussed previously, player movement in MLB is a routine 
occurrence, but the specific nature of the exit event may have consequences on the subsequent 
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relationship between the organization and the player. There is evidence supporting the notion that 
the event of a player moving between organizations, and the nature by which they move will affect 
their future performance (Jackson et al., 1988; Kopelman & Pantaleno, 1977; Nicholson, McTeer, 
& White, 1998). Players who depart from organizations may harbor resentment towards their 
former employer for not considering the player and their respective abilities as of enough value to 
justify the cost of retaining them (Ortiz & Massarotti, 2007; Tewksbury & Miller, 2018). If the 
extra motivation for high performance is sufficiently impactful, it could overcome the advantages, 
if any, that their former team would enjoy due to their exclusive knowledge of the player. Adapting 
from Grohsjean et al. (2016), involuntary exit is an indicator of whether the player exited their 
former team involuntarily due to the team cutting them. Other types of potentially involuntary 
exits, such as trades, are not included due to unknown variance in player preferences. 
Number of prior teams. Organizations are more likely to benefit from knowledge that is 
uniquely held and protected as opposed to information that is disseminated widely (McEvily & 
Chakravarthy, 2002; Shamsie & Mannor, 2013). If an organization is the exclusive holder of 
knowledge that leads to a competitive disadvantage for the opponent, then all other organizations 
competing against that particular competitor do so without the benefit of private information 
(Bergh et al., 2019; Connelly et al., 2011). Under the condition that the former organization is the 
only other team that the player has played for, this information is unique to the focal team and the 
advantage will be relative to all other teams in baseball. However, organizations do not have total 
control and ownership of their knowledge resources as these are, at least partially, embedded in 
the organization’s inherently mobile human capital (Coff, 1997). As private information specific 
to a given player is acquired through the unique access provided from having the player on the 
roster, other organizations may be able to duplicate the process once the player has left the team. 
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With the assumption that access to knowledge through control is a means of overcoming barriers 
to imitation related to causal ambiguity (King & Zeithaml, 2001), then the superior performance 
over a player derived from residual knowledge is only protected from imitation so long as the 
player stays with their next team. Save for retaining all of their players through long-term contracts, 
it is outside the agency of the focal team to protect their knowledge resource from imitation once 
they have left the team’s control. To control for these effects, the number of different MLB rosters 
the player has previously been on prior to the start of the focal season is included.  
Player age in focal season. The player’s age at the time of the matchup may influence their 
relationship to a former organization. Veteran players may possess an understanding of the 
business at the heart of the sport and may feel less aggression towards a former organization as 
opposed to younger players who may be more inclined to feel slighted by a former organization 
and, thus, compete more aggressively against them. Thus, the player’s age at the time of the 
matchup is included to account for factors influencing performance against a former team that 
stem from age/experience. 
League. There are two leagues that comprise MLB, the National League and the American 
League. For most of baseball history, the only opportunity that teams from different leagues had 
to compete against one another was during the World Series. However, league exclusivity rules 
changed during the time period of the sample, and inter-league play became a part of the regular 
season with the governing rules determined by whichever team was the home team. The primary 
difference in rules governing each league is that the National League requires pitchers to hit for 
themselves in a lineup while the American League allows teams to designate a player who doesn’t 
play in the field to hit in the pitcher’s place. The specialization required to become a pitcher leaves 
little room to develop as a batter to a major-league level, therefore almost all pitchers are 
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significantly worse at hitting than their position player counterparts. Because this rule can impact 
the overall offensive performances of teams by disadvantaging the National League organizations 
when compared to the American League organizations, a dummy is included indicating whether 
the player’s former team is in the American League.  
League Change. As competition between organizations is restricted to intraleague 
competition,10 players who move between teams in the same league will likely have a greater 
familiarity with their opponents than players who move between leagues. A dummy is therefore 
included that indicates whether the player’s current organization is in a different league than their 
former organization. 
Manager Retention. The asymmetric information of an organization over its former 
employee can be embedded in the routines and human capital of the organization. The previous 
manager will directly possess organizational knowledge of the former player and might also be 
more familiar with the routines of the organization enabling them to access embedded knowledge 
more efficiently than a new manager. As such, the carryover of a previous management regime 
from the time of the player’s employment may be a factor in the exploitation of knowledge. Thus, 
as a supplement to the quality of management, a measure of managerial newness is included. This 
measure ranges from 0 to 1. In situations where the former manager is fired at some point during 
the focal season, the measure will reflect the percentage of games that they managed in that season. 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
This chapter examines how competing with former employees affects an organization’s 
performance. Because the measure of performance is already a relative measure of performance 
 
10 Even after the inclusion of a set of interleague games began in 1997, the majority of a baseball team’s games are 
between opponents in their division and in their league. 
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against the former organization compared to performance against other teams, an OLS regression 
model is used to test the hypotheses. Robust standard errors are used to contend with 
heteroskedasticity in the data. The correlations in the matrix presented in Table 1 do not prompt 
concern about multi-collinearity as they all fall well below the .7 threshold for multicollinearity. 
Further, additional testing for multicollinearity is conducted through a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) test. The results of this test are presented in Table 6. This test shows the highest VIF among 
the variables is approximately 2.25, well below the 10 level where multicollinearity concerns are 
warranted. 
RESULTS 
The data were analyzed using ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors. 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 2. The average performance in a 
player’s matchup against their former team is 99.769, just below the 100-level indicating parity 
with their performance against all other teams.  
Table 3 contains the results of the OLS regression models. The first model presents the 
base case and regresses only the dependent variable. The second model introduces the control 
variables and is used to test Hypothesis 1A and 1B, which concern the main effects of competition 
between former players and organizations. The second model finds no statistically significant 
effect that is consistent with either alternative hypothesis regarding the main effects of competition 
between former players and teams. Having found no evidence to support the main effects, the 
remaining models test the contingencies hypothesized.  
In the third model, the pre-2004 measure indicating whether the focal season matchup takes 
place prior to the Analytics era is used to test whether the effects of analytics adoption across the 
field of competitors will erode the organization’s advantage over their former employees as stated 
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in Hypothesis 2. The results are significant at the 0.05 level and have a negative coefficient, 
corroborating Hypothesis 2. These results remain consistent when tested in the full model. 
Therefore, in the absence of widespread adoption of analytics, there is evidence to suggest that 
organizations may have an advantage over their former employees in dyadic competition with the 
employee’s new organization.  
For Hypothesis 3, the quality of the organization’s manager during the dyadic competition 
against the former player, as tested in the fourth model, is not statistically significant. The lack of 
statistical significance for the coefficient carries over when tested in the full model. 
In the fifth model, the results from testing Hypothesis 4, no statistical significance is found 
for the coefficient of player quality, though the positive direction of the coefficient is consistent 
with the hypothesized direction. 
Among the control variables, there was broadly no statistical significance found, except 
the coefficient of League-wide tOPS, which is the measure of the organization’s performance 
against all players across the league and was consistently significant (p < 0.01) and, as would be 
expected, in a positive direction across all models tested. 
Additional robustness checks are included in Table 4 and 5. The first models in Table 4 
look at whether the pre2004 indicator as a proxy for being before the proliferation of analytics 
holds up by testing two years ahead and two years before the 2004 year of publication. The effects 
of indicators for matchups in seasons prior to the 2005 and 2006 seasons remain significant and 
the coefficient remains negative and grows in magnitude each additional year, consistent with the 
hypothesized effects of more and more teams adopting analytics. However, neither of the 
indicators for matchups occurring before the two seasons prior to 2004 are statistically significant. 
The final models in Table 4 test for the effects of analytics expertise and intensity as proxies for 
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the implementation and confirmation stages of innovation adoption. The expertise measure is 
statistically significant and positive, consistent with Hypothesis 2 and the test for the Pre-
Analytics/Awareness variable. The intensity measure is not statistically significant, and the 
statistical significance of the Pre-Analytics and Analytics Expertise variables fall out when both 
are included in the model.  
The models in Table 5 include dummies to control for variance at the individual 
organization-level. As we control for every team in the league with individual dummy variables, 
the constant is suppressed in subsequent models for interpretive purposes. While some 
organization effects are statistically significant, the results found initially remain consistent. The 
final models in Table 5 test for an interaction effect between managerial quality and matchups 
occurring prior to the sabermetrics era. The rationale behind this would be that quality managers 
would have a greater impact during the period where asymmetric information was seemingly more 
important for organizations. However, no statistical significance is found in the model.  
Table 6 includes the robustness models testing for the Analytics Expertise and Analytics 
Experience measures that proxy for the Implementation and Confirmation stages of innovation 
adoption respectively. The table also includes the model testing for the pre-2004 measure for the 
analytics era variable, for comparative purposes. The coefficient for Analytics Expertise is 
significant (p<.05) and in a positive direction as hypothesized. No statistical significance is found 
for the Analytics Experience coefficient, though its positive direction is as hypothesized.   
Table 7 details the results of a Variance Inflation Factor test, while Tables 8-10 include 
respectively include a variance ratio test, t-test with unequal variances, and descriptive statistics 
for the statistically significant, Pre-Analytics Era variable. The data also include an outlier 
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observation where the dependent variable has a measure of 1,028. Removing this observation from 
the data and rerunning the regressions does not affect the consistency of the results. 
DISCUSSION 
This study looked at competition between organizations and their former employees from 
a strategic factor market lens. The proposed source of superior performance is asymmetric 
information, and each party possesses private information on the other, thus competing hypotheses 
were tested for the main effects. While agnostic as to the direction of the main effects, no statistical 
significance was found for either hypothesis. 
Examined next are some conditional factors that could positively moderate the main effects 
in either the organization or the former employee’s direction. First, the adoption of advanced 
analytics capabilities is proposed to erode the advantages stemming from asymmetric information. 
As such, the advantages are expected to favor the organization over the former employee for 
matchups occurring before the widespread adoption of analytics across baseball. The results for 
matchups occurring before the start of the analytics era (2004) were statistically significant (p < 
0.05) and favored the organization over their former player as hypothesized. The effect grew 
stronger in terms of an increasing coefficient in robustness check models using the following two 
years (2005 and 2006), which would be expected as more latecomers adopted analytics 
capabilities, and early adopters continued to develop their incumbent capabilities (Baumer, 2015). 
However, models including the previous years as robustness checks did not provide statistically 
significant results for the prior to 2003 and 2002 season coefficients indicating an advantage in the 
direction of former players, as would be expected. 
In addition to the effects of the publication of Moneyball as a proxy for the mass awareness 
stage of analytics as a technology for baseball, also examined were the effects of the 
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implementation and confirmation stages through the proxies of Analytics Expertise and Intensity 
respectively. When substituted for the awareness stage variable in the model, the implementation 
stage variable is significant at the .05 level and is associated with a .29 increase in batter 
performance against their former teams for each increase in the number of teams with explicit 
analytics employees, consistent with the hypothesis.  
However, when the additional analytics adoption variables are included in the model with 
the awareness stage variable in an effort to tease apart the effects of each stage, the variables drop 
out of statistical significance. One explanation for this may be that adoption of analytics may not 
necessarily require the use of salaried employees with formal titles. These efforts may also be 
undertaken by college interns and external consultants, neither of whom would be included in the 
formal employee listings from the media guide publications (Baumer & Zimbalist, 2014). In 
addition, the effects of analytics capabilities accumulated over time are proxied by the logged 
number of seasons formal employees are in place, but this may not reflect the real trajectory of 
analytics capability development, nor may it be uniform across organizations.  
Another potential reason for the lack of statistical significance found for the analytics 
intensity measure related to the confirmation stage of innovation adoption is the productivity 
paradox, where investments in information technology do not consistently relate to increases in 
productivity as would be assumed (Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1996; Dewan & Min, 1997). The IT 
research field has found several possible explanations for the counterintuitive results. One such 
explanation is that the nature of the investments in information technology may be determinative 
of organizational performance (Stratopoulos & Dehning, 2000). Successful IT investment that may 
contribute to superior organizational performance may be neutralized by poor IT investment 
strategies. As the analytics efforts of teams across baseball are heterogenous, it may be safe to say 
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that some organizations make better decisions about investing in and structuring their analytics 
capabilities than others. Poor analytics investment decisions may lead to increasingly poor returns 
in perpetuity as the organization’s investments continue along this path. This may require a 
different measure than the analytics intensity measure that assumes learning and individual-level 
strategic resources are homogenous across organizations and employees. It may be useful in the 
future to introduce organizational restructuring as a variable in the model as indicative of a change 
in approach to see whether organizations that recognize problems and act to fix them will mitigate 
or reverse the declining returns of analytics investment on organizational performance. 
Second, it was proposed that the quality of the organization’s managerial capital would 
moderate the organization’s effectiveness in using their information asymmetries to achieve 
superior performance. Higher quality management should be better at recognizing patterns in the 
environment, diagnosing problems, then identifying, retaining, recalling, and applying relevant 
information to formulate a solution. Thus, higher quality managers would be expected to use 
asymmetric information more efficiently than lower quality managers. The results for managerial 
ability were statistically non-significant. In a test conducted on a truncated version of the dataset 
(concluding in 2011), the indicator variable for change in the organization’s management mid-
season showed a low-level of significance (p < 0.1) and the direction of the coefficient was 
positive. However, when the tests were conducted on the full dataset (up to 2018), the coefficient 
was no longer statistically significant. 
Third, it was proposed that, similar to the organization’s managerial capital, the human 
capital of the employee would moderate their ability to utilize information asymmetries. Higher 
quality players were expected to realize a greater advantage over their former team(s) than lower 
quality players who would be less adept at applying their asymmetric information. No supporting 
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evidence is found in the results to suggest that this was the case. This may be conjectured to be 
due to the relative importance of knowledge for performance between organizations and 
employees in the empirical context. Managers compete only through making decisions and, thus, 
may have a greater appreciation for knowledge that can inform those decisions. However, players 
compete using their athleticism and the muscle memory they have developed over years of 
repetitive practice. For players, asymmetric information may be of less importance when compared 
to talent, even for older players whose skills may have declined.  
The movement of employees to competitors generally leads to negative outcomes for the 
originating organization (Carnahan & Somaya, 2013; Chen et al., 2007; Mawdsley & Somaya, 
2016). By shining a light on information asymmetries stemming from an organization’s residual 
knowledge, this study contributes to the understanding of the effects on an organization when its 
employees leave to join or start a competitor organization. Previous research on the potential 
mitigating benefits from employee movement to competitors focuses on the competitor 
organization’s status (Tan & Rider, 2017) or the organization’s overall innovation practices 
(Tzabbar & Kehoe, 2014). Here, the benefits from residual knowledge depend on the specific 
attributes of the exited employee and the nature of subsequent competitive interactions between 
the two organizations. 
This study also contributes to both the strategic factor market and employee mobility 
research streams based on the uniting axiom that an organization knows more about its own 
resources (employees) than about those in the external environment (Bidwell, 2011; Makadok & 
Barney, 2001). It adds to the SFM discussion of sources of informational advantage by presenting 
the information asymmetries stemming from the organization’s analysis of its residual knowledge 
on a former employee as a hybrid of the external and internal search concepts. It builds on two 
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extensions of classical SFM models – those that examine ex ante competition into the subsequent 
product market (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Chatain, 2014) and those that model sellers as 
endogenous and imbue them with agency (Asmussen, 2015; Chatain, 2014; Ross, 2012) – to 
scrutinize the heretofore unexplored area of competitive interactions between buyers and sellers 
of strategic resources in the subsequent product market. In linking the quality of managers of seller 
organizations to applying residual knowledge in the subsequent product market, it addresses a 
critique of the SFM literature which downplays the complex role of managerial discretion 
(Leiblein et al., 2017; Maritan & Peteraf, 2011).  
This study also contributes to the emerging literature on the adoption and usage of analytics 
in organizations (Bose, 2009; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 1995; Devaraj & Kohli, 2003; Dewan & Min, 
1997; Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). The results suggest that the adoption of analytics across an 
industry can significantly moderate the performance advantages of organizations within the 
industry. While noteworthy, this finding may require additional research in other contexts to verify 
its generalizability.   
An additional area this study contributes to is work examining cross-level effects between 
individual and unit performance (Call et al., 2015; Carpenter et al., 2001; Eggers & Kaplan, 2013; 
Huckman & Pisano, 2006; Kor & Leblebici, 2005; Marquis & Tilcsik, 2013; Nyberg et al., 2014; 
Ployhart & Moliterno, 2011). In examining how complementarities in human capital at the unit 
and individual level impact performance, this stream has focused entirely on within-organization 
factors and performance relative to all competitors, neglecting how cross-level factors between 
specific organizations may impact performance in competitive interactions. This study addresses 
this research gap by examining the relationship between factors at multiple levels of human capital 
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across competing organizations and how these factors can contribute to an organization achieving 
superior performance disadvantaging a competitor. 
Additionally, the study also has implications for practice, specifically pertaining to the HR 
practices of evaluating and training employees. In industries where organizations engage one 
another in representative competition, an organization could benefit by taking a longer view in its 
HR policy by developing intelligence on its own employees that could both improve their value-
generating abilities within the organization and undermine these abilities should they migrate to a 
competitor.  
Finally, a potentially serious confound must be discussed as an event occurring within the 
sample. The beginning of the time-period representing the era of analytics proliferation coincides 
with the fallout across the league from the Mitchell Report on the use of performance-enhancing 
drugs in MLB. The Mitchell report led to rule changes involving mandatory, league-wide random 
drug testing and increasingly stricter punishments for positive tests which may bias the effect of 
analytics proliferation on an individual’s performance against their former organization. However, 
it is maintained that the direction of any bias would be opposite to the direction predicted by 
Hypothesis 2 and reflected in the results, therefore strengthening the evidence of corroboration. If 
the private knowledge an organization holds on their former players includes the player’s use of 
performance enhancing drugs while they were with the organization, the organization would be in 
the unique position to identify that player as experiencing reduced strength and power presuming 
that the implementation of mandatory testing leads the player to cease his usage. As such, the 
organization may take a more aggressive approach against their former player than will 
organizations operating under the assumption that the player’s current ability is consistent with 




The scope of this study is limited to examining how information asymmetries may affect 
competition between an organization and the individual employees representing a competitor 
organization. Superior performance in this study refers to an organization’s superior performance 
against a given individual of a competing organization relative to all other competing 
organizations. The focus of the current study is limited to examining superior performance across 
the organization and individual levels, i.e. between employees and their former organizations, and 
is agnostic regarding an organization’s superior performance at the organizational level. However, 
to lead to superior performance at the organization-level, it is necessary that the aggregation of an 
organization’s competitive advantages is greater than its aggregation of competitive disadvantages 
(Powell, 2001). Therefore, the cross-level superior performance of focus in this study represents a 
necessary, albeit not sufficient condition for an organization’s superior performance against 
competing organizations.  
The hypotheses regarding an employee’s advantage over their previous organization are 
not corroborated in the model. One reason for this empirical result may be that asymmetries from 
the knowledge a player has developed over their former organization may only be relevant if the 
specific resources the player’s knowledge pertains to remains with the organization when the 
player next competes against them. The effects of organizational turnover on its subsequent 
performance against former employees is, therefore, one avenue for future research. This study 
does not include data on the similarity between the former organization’s roster at the point the 
player left and the roster at the time of the focal matchup but would collect these data in the future.  
Examining if and how advantages from individual and organizational information asymmetries 
translates to performance in interorganizational competition is an avenue for future research. 
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Finally, given the finding that an industry’s adoption and usage of analytics may 
significantly moderate any information asymmetry-based performance advantages of 
organizations, future research could look at other industries and practices where this substitutive 
effect may also be found. One key advantage of choosing the MLB context for this study, the 
abundance of rich and precise measures for performance, may also contribute to the effectiveness 
of analytics-driven decision making as a substitute for asymmetric information about competitor 
organizations and employees. Industries where rich metrics of performance are observable and 
available at low or no cost, such as in public litigation or political lobbying, or where credible 
third-party entities vet and aggregate industry data for public consumption, such as industries 
composed primarily with public companies or consumer products with multiple rating agencies. 
Practices where decisions are typically couched more on soft skills and intuition, such as hiring 
new employees or implementing change in corporate culture can also be a fertile context to look 
for the moderating effects of analytics usage, should the observable implementation of analytics-
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics  
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 OPS: Tm v Frmr Plyr 2940 99.769 70.842 -100 1078 
 League AL 2942 .47 .499 0 1 
 League Change 2942 .231 .422 0 1 
 Player Age 2942 31.617 3.5 21 43 
 League-wide tOPS 2942 99.944 9.39 72 128 
 Involuntary Exit 2942 .061 .239 0 1 
 Log: Yrs since Exit 2942 1.043 .764 0 2.773 
 Log: Yrs w/Frmr Tm 2942 1.016 .747 0 2.773 
 Prior Teams 2942 2.56 1.547 0 10 
 Season OPS 2942 .792 .097 .485 1.422 
 Manager Ability Index 2301 .478 .028 .256 .549 
 Manager Retention 2942 .434 .484 0 1 
 Before 2004 Season 2942 .487 .5 0 1 






Table 3: Regressions of Player Performance against their Former Organization Relative to All  
  












 LeagueAL  -4.166 -4.742* -2.730 -4.398 -4.200 -2.955 
    (2.795) (2.801) (3.203) (2.811) (2.788) (3.161) 
 League Change  -1.995 -2.862 -3.406 -1.983 -1.928 -4.009 
    (4.031) (4.020) (4.827) (4.032) (4.046) (4.770) 
 Player Age  -0.242 -0.186 -0.374 -0.247 -0.395 -0.387 
    (0.464) (0.466) (0.498) (0.464) (0.479) (0.512) 
 League-wide tOPS  0.883*** 0.880*** 0.715*** 0.906*** 0.883*** 0.716*** 
    (0.149) (0.148) (0.165) (0.151) (0.148) (0.165) 
 Involuntary Exit  -5.632 -6.124 -1.471 -5.772 -5.621 -2.353 
    (5.453) (5.464) (5.752) (5.437) (5.453) (5.788) 
 Log: Yrs since exit  -0.191 -0.358 0.581 1.188 -0.268 0.373 
    (1.790) (1.790) (2.177) (2.005) (1.790) (2.183) 
 Log: Yrs w/frmr Tm  -0.282 -0.351 -1.055 -0.413 -0.460 -1.224 
    (1.868) (1.864) (1.975) (1.874) (1.897) (2.001) 
 Prior Teams  -0.189 -0.444 -0.822 -0.136 -0.087 -1.090 
    (1.061) (1.072) (1.122) (1.061) (1.063) (1.146) 
 seasonOPS  13.030 13.976 11.114 13.218 2.252 4.540 
    (12.181) (12.174) (12.657) (12.180) (17.854) (19.545) 
 Before 2004 Season   -6.632**    -5.971* 
     (2.608)    (3.110) 
 Manager Ability Index    -86.415*   -85.915* 
      (49.729)   (49.678) 
 Manager Retention    2.526 4.618  2.171 
      (3.295) (3.066)  (3.315) 
 Player Quality      22.958 12.096 
        (27.481) (30.586) 
 _cons 99.769*** 12.588 14.940 75.113** 6.908 9.356 76.936** 
   (1.307) (19.986) (19.973) (35.814) (20.564) (20.317) (36.045) 
 Obs. 2940 2940 2940 2299 2940 2940 2299 
 R-squared 0.000 0.015 0.017 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.015 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 4: Robustness Checks (Dependent Variable=tOPS) 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
       Pre 2005    Pre 2006    Pre 2003    Pre 2002    Adj. 
Manager 
Score 
 American League -4.919* -5.033* -4.375 -4.220 -4.268 
   (2.805) (2.807) (2.799) (2.796) (2.801) 
 League Change -3.034 -3.139 -2.522 -2.234 -2.000 
   (4.019) (4.013) (4.031) (4.036) (4.033) 
 Player Age -0.174 -0.173 -0.205 -0.227 -0.238 
   (0.466) (0.467) (0.466) (0.466) (0.464) 
 League-wideOPS 0.881*** 0.883*** 0.881*** 0.882*** 0.862*** 
   (0.148) (0.148) (0.148) (0.149) (0.151) 
 Involuntary Exit -5.859 -5.443 -6.011 -5.778 -5.701 
   (5.447) (5.442) (5.472) (5.467) (5.442) 
 Log: Yrs since Exit -0.406 -0.417 -0.279 -0.241 1.347 
   (1.791) (1.792) (1.789) (1.790) (2.020) 
 Log: Yrs w/frmrTm -0.355 -0.349 -0.351 -0.317 -0.409 
   (1.864) (1.865) (1.867) (1.869) (1.873) 
 Prior Teams -0.436 -0.386 -0.371 -0.278 -0.092 
   (1.069) (1.070) (1.076) (1.079) (1.063) 
 Season OPS 14.984 15.233 13.216 12.978 13.592 
   (12.169) (12.192) (12.183) (12.191) (12.162) 
 Pre2005 -7.157***     
   (2.665)     
 Pre2006  -7.338***    
    (2.729)    
 Pre2003   -3.852   
     (2.576)   
 Pre2002    -1.764  
      (2.559)  
 Adj Manager Ability     -22.671 
       (23.198) 
 Manager Retention     5.391* 
       (3.264) 
 _cons 14.451 14.297 13.995 13.356 20.704 
   (19.934) (19.920) (20.037) (20.083) (24.389) 
 Obs. 2940 2940 2940 2940 2940 
 R-squared  0.017 0.017 0.015 0.015 0.016 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  





Table 5: Regressions on tOPS w/Team-Level Controls  
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 


















 ARI  40.035** 29.621 40.299** 70.715* 40.427** 67.524* 
    (15.886) (28.015) (15.921) (40.436) (15.932) (40.400) 
 ATL -30.457** 19.192 8.779 24.902* 55.317 25.229** 52.326 
   (13.960) (12.414) (23.877) (12.772) (39.954) (12.787) (39.926) 
 BAL -5.820 29.168** 18.755 32.289** 62.705 32.386** 59.482 
   (15.197) (13.582) (28.222) (13.707) (40.682) (13.710) (40.640) 
 BOS -17.762 21.619* 11.206 23.842** 54.257 23.737** 50.833 
   (13.432) (11.532) (26.146) (11.608) (39.738) (11.621) (39.719) 
 CAL -16.506 21.756* 11.343 25.699** 56.114 25.825** 52.922 
   (13.673) (11.647) (26.074) (11.765) (39.816) (11.777) (39.817) 
 CHC -9.401 33.376** 22.963 35.576*** 65.991* 35.291*** 62.388 
   (14.519) (12.955) (24.988) (13.179) (38.211) (13.183) (38.223) 
 CHW -22.063 14.944 4.531 16.234 46.650 16.329 43.426 
   (14.810) (12.872) (26.992) (12.929) (39.627) (12.943) (39.603) 
 CIN 12.737 47.970*** 37.557 50.384*** 80.799** 50.497*** 77.594** 
   (15.659) (14.441) (26.349) (14.599) (39.440) (14.614) (39.436) 
 CLE -17.690 18.702 8.288 20.502* 50.917 20.946* 48.043 
   (13.787) (11.654) (26.648) (11.800) (39.977) (11.825) (39.934) 
 COL -3.817 25.540* 15.127 25.007* 55.423 25.212* 52.309 
   (15.761) (14.301) (28.131) (14.373) (40.615) (14.387) (40.589) 
 DET 2.960 32.921** 22.508 36.129** 66.544 35.617** 62.714 
   (16.501) (14.947) (29.665) (15.086) (42.751) (15.083) (42.748) 
 FLA -12.915 25.633** 15.219 27.996** 58.411 27.677** 54.774 
   (13.918) (12.143) (25.838) (12.253) (39.057) (12.244) (39.008) 
 HOU -3.118 39.820*** 29.406 41.389*** 71.805* 41.726*** 68.822* 
   (14.268) (12.780) (24.847) (12.975) (37.907) (12.992) (37.884) 
 KCR -9.167 20.566 10.153 20.030 50.446 19.517 46.614 
   (14.521) (12.655) (27.779) (12.927) (39.808) (12.899) (39.773) 
 LAD 3.771 52.283*** 41.870* 54.948*** 85.363** 55.165*** 82.262** 
   (19.080) (19.151) (25.210) (19.338) (38.978) (19.350) (38.965) 
 MIL -16.843 18.234 7.820 20.071 50.486 19.421 46.518 
   (14.678) (12.879) (27.051) (13.055) (39.580) (13.063) (39.592) 
 MIN -3.124 31.605*** 21.191 29.393** 59.809 29.511** 56.608 
   (14.026) (12.258) (26.757) (12.484) (39.541) (12.496) (39.527) 
 MON -7.418 33.742*** 23.328 35.269*** 65.685* 35.593*** 62.689 
   (13.990) (12.451) (25.358) (12.596) (38.598) (12.606) (38.574) 
 NYM -15.856 27.771** 17.358 30.411** 60.827 30.710** 57.807 
   (14.099) (12.552) (24.139) (12.758) (38.112) (12.769) (38.090) 
 NYY 3.478 44.062*** 33.649 47.888*** 78.303* 48.323*** 75.420* 
   (13.785) (11.885) (26.018) (11.980) (39.952) (12.034) (39.883) 
 OAK -14.152 25.547** 15.134 26.431** 56.846 27.033** 54.130 
   (13.746) (11.728) (26.198) (11.784) (40.315) (11.818) (40.280) 
 PHI 10.068 48.739*** 38.326 50.364*** 80.779** 49.775*** 76.872** 
   (14.338) (12.933) (25.463) (13.173) (38.582) (13.197) (38.621) 
 PIT -1.519 33.218** 22.804 33.189** 63.605 33.519** 60.616 
   (15.253) (14.157) (27.651) (14.384) (39.704) (14.412) (39.639) 
 SDP -13.857 27.057** 16.643 29.112** 59.527 29.373** 56.470 
   (13.773) (12.117) (25.032) (12.354) (38.503) (12.369) (38.479) 
 SEA -13.131 23.833** 13.420 25.545** 55.960 25.876** 52.973 
   (13.985) (11.910) (26.057) (12.067) (39.783) (12.085) (39.772) 
 SFG -11.356 32.309** 21.896 35.624*** 66.040* 36.359*** 63.456 
   (14.851) (13.213) (25.462) (13.336) (38.906) (13.367) (38.860) 
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   (13.915) (12.438) (24.514) (12.663) (38.830) (12.679) (38.790) 
 TBD -38.255**  -10.413  30.415  27.097 
   (16.093)  (26.372)  (39.911)  (39.909) 
 TEX -5.548 27.125** 16.712 28.237** 58.653 28.710** 55.807 
   (14.106) (12.119) (27.091) (12.308) (40.285) (12.339) (40.251) 
 TOR -12.132 25.714** 15.301 28.808** 59.224 27.656** 54.753 
   (14.219) (12.183) (26.326) (12.403) (39.732) (12.499) (39.824) 
 American League  2.349 2.349 2.111 2.111 2.075 2.075 
    (5.807) (5.807) (5.776) (5.776) (5.779) (5.779) 
 League Change  -0.844 -0.844 -1.559 -1.559 -1.593 -1.593 
    (5.160) (5.160) (5.108) (5.108) (5.110) (5.110) 
 Player Age  -0.407 -0.407 -0.457 -0.457 -0.452 -0.452 
    (0.521) (0.521) (0.532) (0.532) (0.532) (0.532) 
 League-wide tOPS  0.834*** 0.834*** 0.855*** 0.855*** 0.843*** 0.843*** 
    (0.176) (0.176) (0.177) (0.177) (0.178) (0.178) 
 Involuntary Exit  -1.382 -1.382 -1.717 -1.717 -1.475 -1.475 
    (5.877) (5.877) (5.920) (5.920) (5.944) (5.944) 
 Log:Yrs since exit  -0.296 -0.296 1.119 1.119 1.246 1.246 
    (2.019) (2.019) (2.261) (2.261) (2.269) (2.269) 
 Log:Yrs w/frmr Tm  -0.662 -0.662 -0.762 -0.762 -0.741 -0.741 
    (2.127) (2.127) (2.151) (2.151) (2.154) (2.154) 
 Prior_Teams  -0.872 -0.872 -1.055 -1.055 -1.039 -1.039 
    (1.153) (1.153) (1.171) (1.171) (1.172) (1.172) 
 seasonOPS  14.960 14.960 7.955 7.955 8.481 8.481 
    (13.246) (13.246) (19.524) (19.524) (19.516) (19.516) 
 Before 2004 Season    -6.570** -6.570** 3.140 3.140 
      (3.199) (3.199) (10.248) (10.248) 
 Manager Ability Index    -93.479* -93.479* -84.955 -84.955 
      (55.524) (55.524) (56.125) (56.125) 
 Manager Retention    3.485 3.485 4.089 4.089 
      (3.455) (3.455) (3.516) (3.516) 
 Player Quality    12.256 12.256 11.276 11.276 
      (31.132) (31.132) (31.165) (31.165) 
 Manager*Sabermetrics      -21.968 -21.968 
        (21.608) (21.608) 
 _cons 108.290*** -10.413  30.415  27.097  
   (12.349) (26.372)  (39.911)  (39.909)  
 Obs. 2299 2299 2299 2299 2299 2299 2299 
 R-squared 0.020 0.031 0.688 0.035 0.689 0.035 0.689 
 
Standard errors are in parenthesis  





Table 6: Regressions with Analytics Adoption Stages (Dependent Variable=tOPS)  
      (1)   (2)   (3) 
       Analytics 
Awareness 
   Analytics 
Implemntn 
   Analytics 
Confirmation 
 League AL -4.48 -4.733* -4.693 
   (2.805) (2.832) (2.933) 
 League Change -2.862 -2.961 -3.15 
   (4.02) (4.048) (4.24) 
 League-wide tOPS .861*** .862*** .763*** 
   (.149) (.149) (.154) 
 Player Age -.16 -.167 -.345 
   (.465) (.466) (.468) 
 Involuntary Exit -5.992 -5.151 -5.425 
   (5.462) (5.456) (5.547) 
 Log: Yrs since exit -.414 -.466 -.087 
   (1.788) (1.792) (1.827) 
 Log: Yrs w/frmr Tm -.351 -.296 .553 
   (1.863) (1.863) (1.911) 
 Prior Teams -.453 -.288 .103 
   (1.072) (1.064) (1.081) 
 Season OPS 14.324 16.129 14.928 
   (12.18) (12.169) (12.338) 
 Manager Retention -8.003 -8.054 -9.686 
   (6.972) (6.97) (7.016) 
 Pre-2004 -6.799***   
   (2.613)   
 Analytics Expertise  .298**  
    (.127)  
 Analytics Experience   .016 
     (.016) 
 _cons 23.39 15.499 33.059 
   (21.199) (21.137) (21.691) 
 Observations 2940 2940 2776 
 R-squared .017 .017 .013 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 





Table 7: Variance inflation factor  
     VIF   1/VIF 
 Plyr Qlty 2.333 .429 
 seasonOPS 2.112 .473 
 Player Age 1.721 .581 
 Prior Teams 1.633 .612 
 Log: frmr Tm Yrs 1.237 .809 
 Log: Yrs since exit 1.188 .842 
 League-wide tOPS 1.083 .923 
 Mgr Ability Index 1.066 .938 
 LeagueAL 1.061 .943 
 Involuntary Exit 1.05 .953 
 Sabermetrics Era 1.047 .955 
 League Change 1.044 .958 
 Mgr Retention 1.02 .98 
 Mean VIF 1.354 . 
 
Table 8: Variance ratio test: Pre vs Analytics Era 
 
 Group   Obs  Mean  Std.Err.  Std.Dev.  [95%Conf.  Interval] 
0  1509   102.625     2.035    79.059    98.633   106.617 
1  1431    96.758     1.609    60.873    93.601    99.914 
combined  2940    99.769     1.307    70.842    97.207   102.331 
 
    ratio = sd(0) / sd(1)                                         f =   1.6867 
Ho: ratio = 1                                  degrees of freedom = 1508, 1430 
    Ha: ratio < 1               Ha: ratio != 1                 Ha: ratio > 1 
  Pr(F < f) = 1.0000         2*Pr(F > f) = 0.0000           Pr(F > f) = 0.0000 
 
Table 9: Two-sample t test with unequal variances  
     obs1    obs2    Mean1    Mean2    dif    St_Err    t_value    p_value 
 tOPS by Pre2004: 0 1 1509 1431 102.625 96.758 5.867 2.612 2.25 .025 
 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics for tOPS split by Pre and Analytics Era 
PreSaber    N   mean   sd   min   p25   p50   p75   max 
 0 1509 102.625 79.059 -100 55 98 144 1078 
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CHAPTER 3: DO CHEATERS EVER PROSPER? ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION 
FROM ILLICIT COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
PERFORMANCE 
INTRODUCTION 
Asymmetric information, a condition where one party has more or better information than 
another, can lead to superior performance for those organizations capable of exploiting their 
information advantage through complementary resources (Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, & 
Boyd, 2019; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Nayyar, 1990). For example, in the used 
car market, the selling party typically enjoys an informational advantage ex ante over the buyer as 
to the quality of the used car (Akerlof, 1970). Conversely, in the insurance market, it is the buyer 
who typically possesses superior information to the seller regarding a buyer’s ex post usage 
intentions (Arrow, 1963; Holmstrom, 1979). The second chapter looked at how asymmetric 
information may be derived by each party involved in an employee mobility event. This third 
chapter considers asymmetric information across competitors via competitive intelligence.  
As organizations become more structurally complex, critical information obtained by 
lower-level employees is at greater risk of being distorted or blocked from reaching the decision-
makers who need it (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1994; Rousseau, 1978; Smith, Grimm, Gannon, & 
Chen, 1991). A key contribution of Porter (1980) is the recognition of the need for a formalized, 
systematic competitive intelligence capability in organizations to keep decision makers informed 
of consequential developments in their industries and markets.  
Better informed managers can complement the organization’s other resources by making 
decisions that lead to relatively more effective bundling and deployment of resources (Bailey & 
Helfat, 2003; Helfat & Peteraf, 2015; Levenson, Van der Stede, & Cohen, 2006; Sirmon, Hitt, & 
Ireland, 2007). These decisions are made within a dynamic competitive context, where competitive 
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actions taken by an organization to improve their position in a given market may prompt 
competitors to respond through taking actions themselves (Chen, Smith, & Grimm, 1992; 
D’Aveni, Dagnino, & Smith, 2010; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999). As such, organizations can 
benefit from competitive intelligence that helps them to better understand the competitors in their 
market before they act towards them (Smith et al., 1991; Tsai, Su, & Chen, 2011). 
As defined by the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP), competitive 
intelligence is a set of legal and ethical methods for collecting, developing, analyzing, and 
disseminating actionable information pertaining to competitors, suppliers, customers, the 
organization itself and the business environment to inform decision makers on the past, present, 
and future behavior of these entities (McGonagle & Vella, 2002; Yap & Rashid, 2011). Examples 
of public sources of competitive intelligence data include patent filings, building permit 
applications, SEC compliant 10-Ks, and press releases among others.  
The SCIP definition specifically excludes the collection of data outside legal and ethical 
norms (Crane, 2005). However, research shows that, in practice, organizations or their agents may 
apply illicit methods for data collection that are frowned upon or even forbidden by normative 
institutions such as the SCIP alongside those standard methods that are compliant with SCIP codes 
(Gelb, Saxton, Zinkhan, & Albers, 1991; Ng Kwet Shing & Spence, 2002; Trevino & Weaver, 
1997).  
Although illicit methods may differ ethically and legally from the open source methods 
that are standard practice in competitive intelligence, they are similar in their purpose to provide 
information to managers that leads to better strategic and tactical decisions (Caudron, 1994; 
Fitzpatrick, 2003; Penenberg & Barry, 2000). However, as industry sanctioned competitive 
intelligence methods use resources available in the market and are limited to collecting data from 
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open sources ostensibly also available to competitors, these standard and widely-diffused methods 
are less likely to yield asymmetric information from which persistent superior performance might 
be derived11 (Barney & Clark, 2007). Limiting the sourcing of competitive intelligence data to 
“…only visible capabilities and limited financial data, an incumbent firm could conclude that a 
disadvantaged rival is not capable of competing when in fact it may have significant invisible 
assets.” (Grimm, Lee, & Smith, 2006, p.123). However, illicit competitive intelligence methods, 
meeting definitions in the extant literature that range from “creative competitive intelligence” to 
“industrial espionage” (Crane, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2003) are less likely to be imitated by competitors 
and, thus, more likely to yield asymmetric information that could potentially provide superior 
performance to the organization possessing it. Although obtained through unscrupulous means, 
the use of illicit competitive intelligence may be rationalized by those organizations practicing it 
in various ways including if the information yielded is of sufficiently high value (Caudron, 1994; 
Gelb et al., 1991), the organization’s performance has been below aspirations (Baucus & Near, 
1991; Cyert & March, 1963), the likelihood of being discovered and/or the range of resulting 
sanctions are acceptably low (Penenberg & Barry, 2000), and when the organization’s competitors 
are also known to engage in such practices (Caudron, 1994; Kahaner, 1996).  
Despite its use in practice, the competitive intelligence literature has given little attention 
to how illicit competitive intelligence could distinctly affect the performance of an organization. 
Research directly linking competitive intelligence to organizational outcomes is challenging in 
part because the effects on performance are indirect, being mediated through the decisions they 
 
11 For an organization to persist in its superior performance via standard competitive intelligence practices would 
depend on idiosyncratic traits specific to the organization’s competitive intelligence capability such as embeddedness, 
time-compression diseconomies, unique human resources, and causal ambiguity to make it difficult for rivals to 
imitate (Powell & Dent-Micallef, 1997). Embedding a competitive intelligence focus into corporate culture and key 
processes can overcome the market availability of required technology and human capital to achieve superior 
performance (Barney & Clark, 2007; Harris & Davenport, 2007). 
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inform (Ghoshal & Westney, 1991; McGonagle & Vella, 2002). Research focusing on illicit 
competitive intelligence practices is further limited by the challenge of observing activities of a 
clandestine nature (Fitzpatrick, 2003; Ng Kwet Shing & Spence, 2002).  
Through an asymmetric information lens based on the competitive intelligence literature, 
this chapter addresses the question, “How does and under what conditions can asymmetric 
information obtained through illicit competitive intelligence impact an organization’s 
performance?” To address this research question, this chapter exploits a case from the Major 
League Baseball (MLB) empirical context.  
The MLB context is appropriate for research on illicit competitive intelligence and 
performance for several reasons. MLB uses sophisticated technology to capture data on individual 
and team performance down to the individual pitch-level and makes these data publicly available. 
MLB represents a highly competitive environment where teams in two leagues and six divisions 
compete against one another during the regular season to win a scarce spot in the postseason 
playoffs. Teams in MLB compete in 162 games each season that are evenly split between home 
and away. During a game, pitchers and catchers communicate asymmetric information to one 
another using a series of coded signals, hidden from the batter, to coordinate on what the next pitch 
will be (Dickson, 2003). However, the practice of “sign-stealing,” where players on the bases will 
attempt to read and communicate the signals to the batter, is a long-held if frowned upon tradition 
(Morris, 2006; Rosenthal & Drellich, 2019; Wheeler, 2015). The formal rules of the game do not 
prohibit this practice, thus it is the responsibility of the pitching team to prevent or discourage this 
from happening (Dickson, 2003). However, the rules do explicitly prohibit the use of electronic 
devices for the purpose of identifying and communicating the signs of the opposing team. 
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Specific to the research question, a publicly-disclosed case in MLB affords a unique 
opportunity to observe the usage of illicit methods, as well as the immediate effects of illicitly 
gained competitive intelligence on organizational performance. In 2019, a former member of the 
2017 World Series Champion Houston Astros revealed that, through most of that season and the 
next, the team had employed a system for observing the signals communicated between the 
opposing pitcher and catcher and communicating the interpreted signal to the Astros hitter through 
audible noises created by banging on a garbage can with a baseball bat. The system relied on a 
closed-circuit camera installed in center field and was therefore in clear violation of MLB rules. 
Despite this, the system was used extensively after initial efforts to fine-tune and disguise the 
system’s existence and usage. As the system depended on the equipment installed at their own 
stadium, the system could only be used for home games, forcing the Astros to compete without 
this source of asymmetric information when they were away. By comparing team performance 
before and after the cheating period began, and examining the performance at home versus away, 
the Astros’ “cheating scandal” is used as a quasi-natural experiment to tease out the effects of 
asymmetric information gained through illicit competitive intelligence on the organization’s 
performance. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First is a review the literatures of 
competitive intelligence and asymmetric information to frame the development of the hypotheses. 
This is followed by a summary of the research design including the data, methods and measures 
used. Results of the tests are next, followed by a discussion of the results including post hoc 
explanations. The chapter concludes with limitations and directions for future research. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Competitive Intelligence, Actions, and Asymmetric Information 
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Competitive intelligence can be traced back to Sun Tzu and his advice to “know thy enemy 
as thyself” (Griffith, 1971). The competitive intelligence literature of today builds off of the 
“environmental scanning” research stream to include elements of search and collection of data, 
analysis and distribution, and integration into decision-making (Aguilar, 1967; Bergen & Peteraf, 
2002; Keegan, 1974; Peteraf & Bergen, 2003). The breadth of activities falling under the 
competitive intelligence umbrella has presented challenges for its operationalization and 
measurement (Calof & Wright, 2008; Lönnqvist & Puhakka, 2006). Nonetheless, researchers and 
practitioners alike have come to understand the importance of an organization’s competitive 
intelligence capability (Bose, 2009; Markovich, Efrat, Raban, & Souchon, 2019; Rehbein, Morris, 
Armacost, & Jamshid, 1992).  
Through its role of adding to and integrating the combined knowledge of an organization 
to inform strategic and tactical decisions, competitive intelligence can contribute to organizational 
performance, both positively and negatively (Beal, 2000; Hughes, Le Bon, & Rapp, 2013; Zahra 
& Chaples, 1993). Competitive intelligence based on data that is accurate, timely, and relevant can 
lead to better decisions and better organizational performance. However, competitive intelligence 
that is based on inaccurate data or mistaken analysis can have disastrous consequences if informing 
key strategic decisions or alerting managers to pending threats (McMullen, Shepherd, & Patzelt, 
2009; Zahra & Chaples, 1993).  
Competitive intelligence in practice can fall under at least four categories: (1) Ad Hoc; (2) 
Continuous-Comprehensive; (3) Continuous-Focused; and (4) Project-Based (Cartwright, 
Boughton, & Miller, 1995; Prescott, 1995). Competitive intelligence of the Ad Hoc variety is 
markedly uncoordinated and resembles the activities that Porter (1980) maintained were 
insufficiently formal and routinized to be effective. Continuous-Comprehensive competitive 
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intelligence is concerned with broadly monitoring ongoing trends in an organization’s industry 
and the global economy. Continuous-Focused competitive intelligence is ongoing monitoring and 
analysis that focuses on specific competitors or issues. Project-based competitive intelligence is a 
formalized project concerned with collecting and analyzing data pertaining to a specific decision 
which requires more attention than ongoing efforts can provide.  
The SCIP, in its normative institutional role, has established codes of conduct to govern 
the activities of those in the competitive intelligence profession. Those codes mandate that the 
sources of data collection are to be limited to public disclosures or open and above-board inquiry 
for competitive intelligence to be legitimate  (Calof & Wright, 2008; Kahaner, 1996; Teo & Choo, 
2001).  
In contrast to legitimate competitive intelligence, Paine (1991) discusses illicit competitive 
intelligence as defined by the collection of data through actions falling under one or more of four 
broad categories, including: misrepresentation, improper influence, covert collection, and 
unsolicited information. Misrepresentation is the use of deception through commission or omission 
in identity and purpose when interacting with potential information sources (Ng Kwet Shing & 
Spence, 2002; Trevino & Weaver, 1997). Misrepresentation by commission includes conducting 
phony job interviews, posing as or hiring a student conducting research, or passing oneself off as 
a potential customer or supplier. Improper influence involves a wide range of techniques to attempt 
to influence potential informants into acting against the target organization’s best interests. 
Blackmail, direct bribes, ostensible promises of employment and/or new business streams, and the 
plying of informants with praise and/or alcohol at conferences all fall under this umbrella and 
range from the obviously illicit to more ethically ambiguous.  
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Though differing in their intents, the final two categories of illicit competitive intelligence, 
covert collection and unsolicited information, are closely related in that they both feature a 
violation of the target organization’s presumption of privacy. Covert collection involves the 
undertaking of unconsented-to observation that represents a violation of the presumption of 
privacy, including the application of technologically sophisticated practices like electronic 
surveillance and aerial photography, as well as eavesdropping on a competitor’s employees at a 
bar they are known to frequent (Crane, 2005). Unsolicited information involves violation of the 
presumption of privacy through forfeiture. Acquiring secrets through the purchase of a used hard 
drive at auction or finding a customer list left behind at a public establishment are examples of 
violating privacy through accident. Unsolicited information is not as stigmatized relative to the 
other categories, though there is greater concern when the forfeiture is made by a third party related 
to the violated organization (Fitzpatrick, 2003; Paine, 1991). 
Competitive intelligence plays an important role in informing manager decisions regarding 
competitive actions (Cartwright et al., 1995; Gelb et al., 1991). Competitive actions are taken by 
organizations for the purpose of disrupting the status quo of a given market to gain an advantage 
(Chen et al., 1992). Competitive actions by an organization can be strategic, such as new product 
introductions, and/or tactical, such as price cuts (Andrevski, Brass, & Ferrier, 2016; Chen et al., 
1992; Ferrier, 2001). Competitive actions can benefit the acting organization upon their launch 
and during a subsequent period of exploitation until the advantages erode due to rival responses 
(Grimm et al., 2006). However, competitive actions also run the risk of prompting “Competitive 
wars” – periods of high intensity competitive activity in a given industry that tend to have negative 
effects for all participants (Basdeo, Smith, Grimm, Rindova, & Derfus, 2006; Porter, 1980; 
Rindova, Becerra, & Contardo, 2004). Despite this downside risk, organizations who practice more 
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complex actions, who act more frequently, and/or who act more aggressively often experience 
superior performance (Chi, Ravichandran, & Andrevski, 2010). Organizations engaging in 
competitive intelligence gathering, especially those using illicit methods, should be cognizant of 
the potential for data collection activities to be perceived as competitive actions that can trigger 
retaliatory actions should they be discovered (Bradford, 2005; Chen, Su, & Tsai, 2007; Rindova 
et al., 2004; Tsai et al., 2011). 
Formal competitive intelligence aims to integrate the knowledge of all members of an 
organization and help to overcome the natural biases of managers that can lead to competitive 
blind spots when those managers engage in informal environmental scanning (Gilad, Gordon, & 
Sudit, 1993; McMullen et al., 2009; Ng, Westgren, & Sonka, 2009). Blind spots can leave the 
organization unprepared to address changes in the industry context, including shifts in technology 
and strategic moves made by competitors (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996; 
Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Decisions made in a domain with a relative dearth of publicly available 
information, such as in the acquisition of private firms, have been shown to have greater variance 
in their associated returns than acquisitions of public corporations where data required for 
competitive intelligence are abundant (Capron & Shen, 2007). For decisions pertaining to the 
acquisition of resources for which there is limited public data, information that can lead to a more 
accurate, precise, and comprehensive estimation of the value of a resource can have considerable 
value to an organization (Barkema & Schijven, 2008; Cuypers, Cuypers, & Martin, 2017; Zaheer, 
Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010).  
When an organization acquires knowledge through its competitive intelligence capability 
that is unique to them and valuable such that its possession would lead other organizations to make 
different decisions (Connelly et al., 2011), this can result in superior performance based on 
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asymmetric information (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Makadok & Barney, 2001; Teece, 1998). An 
organization achieves superior performance relative to its rivals through the acquisition or 
development of superior resources, or through actions that degrade the resources of a competitor 
organization (Barney, 1991; Markman, Gianiodis, & Buchholtz, 2009; Peteraf, 1993; Powell, 
2001; Salop & Scheffman, 1983, 1987; Wernerfelt, 1984). Under an asymmetric information lens, 
the purpose of an organization’s competitive intelligence capability is twofold. First, organizations 
can seek to reduce the informational advantages of competitors by using their competitive 
intelligence efforts for the duplication or imitation of the knowledge that the competitor’s 
advantage is based on (Schmidt & Keil, 2013; Zhang, Li, & Li, 2014). Second, organizations can 
seek to develop their own informational advantages by developing unique knowledge through their 
competitive intelligence efforts (Brush & Artz, 1999; Gao, Yu, & Cannella, 2017; Zaheer & Soda, 
2009). Once an organization has attained an informational advantage, they may apply it 
complementarily with other resources while engaging in competitive actions (Ennen & Richter, 
2010; Ndofor, Sirmon, & He, 2011; Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008). 
At the core of an organization’s superior performance is the knowledge of how to deploy 
the associated resources and capabilities to maintain that advantage. When an organization deploys 
its resources against a rival in a sequential, binary competition, the rival can then decide to respond 
by countering through the deployment of its own resources (Chen et al., 1992). An organization 
may have more effective actions and responses to the rival’s actions relative to other competitors 
when they possess asymmetric information regarding the strengths and weaknesses of the rival’s 
resources (Capron & Chatain, 2008; Sirmon, Hitt, Arregle, & Campbell, 2010; West & DeCastro, 
2001). An organization’s response to competitors will be more effective when it incorporates 
knowledge of the rival’s resources into its own decisions (Tsai et al., 2011). To avoid providing 
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its competitors with an advantage, an organization will seek to keep information that could 
undermine its own performance from leaking (Connelly et al., 2011; Crane, 2005; Liebeskind, 
1996). Through their competitive intelligence capability, organizations will seek to gain a superior 
performance by acquiring asymmetric information pertaining to a particular competitor above 
what is known by the competitive field at large (Gao et al., 2017). 
H1: Illicit competitive intelligence enables higher organizational performance against the 
focal competitor (to whom the intelligence pertains). 
Variety of Competitive Actions 
Environmental uncertainty is the degree to which an absence of pattern, unpredictability, 
and unexpected change characterize the competitive context (Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; Coff, 
1999; Dess & Beard, 1984). Falling under this definition is uncertainty regarding the competitive 
behavior and future actions of rival organizations (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). As much as they 
can, organizations seek to avoid uncertainty (Cyert & March, 1963). If behavioral uncertainty must 
be confronted, organizations may make (mutual) irreversible investments towards the purpose of 
coping with it (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001; Kor & Mahoney, 2005; Leiblein, Chen, & Posen, 2017; 
Li, James, Madhavan, & Mahoney, 2007; McGrath, 1999; Williamson, 1975, 1996).  
Makadok (2011) proposes that asymmetric information typically has greater value as a 
guide for decisions when uncertainty is high than when uncertainty is low. In dynamic competitive 
environments, as the degree of uncertainty pertaining to a competitor’s actions increases, so does 
the value of instruments for coping with that uncertainty such as flexibility (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 
1987) and forecasting (Cyert, Feigenbaum, & March, 1959; Yasai-Ardekani & Nystrom, 1996). 
Mitigating this uncertainty involves forecasting which action, out of a bounded range of actions 
available, a competitor is likely to take. Forecasting may involve extrapolating tendencies from 
historic data and/or applying judgment based on the decision maker’s intuition and knowledge of 
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the context, thus seeking additional information can help to cope with uncertainty by enhancing 
forecasting abilities (Kuhn & Sniezek, 1996; Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, & Önkal, 2006).  
In dyadic competitive interactions, an organization is concerned with the uncertainty 
pertaining to the opponent’s competitive behavior (Ferrier, 2001; Rothkopf & Harstad, 1994). 
Organizations make strategic investments in actions and responses to potential competitor actions 
in the face of uncertainty as to what those actions will be. Competitive intelligence focused on a 
specific competitor can provide insight into that competitor’s internal capabilities and historic 
behavior.  (Caudron, 1994; Gelb et al., 1991; Yap & Rashid, 2011). In some cases, evidence from 
an organization’s past behavior will be a clear indicator of how they are likely to act in the future, 
reducing the challenge of resolving uncertainty through forecasting (Coyne & Horn, 2009; Nelson 
& Winter, 1982). For example, competitors that respond to price cuts made by rivals by cutting 
prices in kind provides a reasonable expectation that they will do so again in response to future 
price cuts. However, the data on a rival’s historic behavior may not be sufficient to show a clear 
pattern for how they are likely to act in the future, or the data may indicate that the rival tends to 
adopt an intentionally varied approach to responses (Misirlisoy & Haggard, 2014). In such a case, 
the inability of standard competitive intelligence practices to forecast competitor responses leads 
to a high degree of uncertainty for the focal organization as well as any other competitors as to 
how a particular rival is going to act.  
When competitor tendencies lean heavily towards one particular action or sequence of 
actions, an organization may reduce the costs associated with a diversified approach in planning 
for multiple scenarios, while setting themselves up for a stronger position by choosing to focus 
investments towards the most likely scenarios (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). When competitors 
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historic behavior suggests a more varied approach, it increases the relative difficulty of forecasting 
and the costs associated with planning responses (Wernerfelt & Karnani, 1987). 
The high level of uncertainty associated with varied response behavior of a rival presents 
an opportunity for uncertainty resolving competitive intelligence efforts to provide value for an 
organization. When competitors actions are harder to predict due to the relatively more varied 
nature of their actions historically, asymmetric information that can further reduce uncertainty is 
relatively more valuable. Competitive intelligence capabilities that can obtain asymmetric 
information for the increased precision and effectiveness of competitive actions and responses are 
more valuable under conditions of greater uncertainty regarding competitive behavior.  
H2: The positive effect of competitive intelligence on organizational performance is higher 
when the focal competitor’s competitive actions are more varied. 
Signal Fidelity 
Competitive intelligence is a process of collection, analysis, and communication to turn 
inputs of externally sourced raw data into explicable information and actionable recommendations 
(Nasri, 2012). When the raw data input is of low quality, it can result in flawed analysis, and lead 
to bad decisions with undesirable outcomes (McMullen et al., 2009; Zahra & Chaples, 1993). Thus, 
the quality of data is directly related to its value to a given organization (Redman, 1995). In 
organizations, the gap between the expected contribution of a competitive intelligence capability 
and actual performance is often attributed to the quality of the raw data (Ballou & Pazer, 1985).  
In assessing the quality of data, dimensions like accuracy, precision, and reliability are at 
the forefront (Fox, Levitin, & Redman, 1994). In many cases, third parties have vetted the data 
sought after, as is the case with 10-K disclosures, patents, and building permits. In other cases, the 
information may be accessible, but due to resource constraints such as time and manpower, 
uncertainty as to its quality may remain (Bergh et al., 2019; Groysberg & Lee, 2009). When the 
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competitive intelligence desired by an organization goes beyond that which can be derived from 
public sources, such as some trade secrets of competitors, competitive intelligence practitioners 
can make up for these deficiencies by relying on more creative methodologies that may, however, 
result in less reliable data (Fitzpatrick, 2003).  
Poor quality data lead to flawed analyses that inform decisions resulting in ineffective 
strategy. Poor quality data may also lead to breakdowns in the internal dynamics of an organization 
(Wang & Strong, 1996). Flawed analyses based on poor quality data that are communicated 
internally can breed mistrust within an organization (Campbell, Douglass, & Smith-Adams, 2004). 
Employees who lose trust in their organization may become less identified  with the organization, 
less self-sufficient, and less productive as result (Braun, 1997; Ozyilmaz, Erdogan, & 
Karaeminogullari, 2018). 
Thus, as the confidence of individual employees in the intelligence provided by their 
organization increases or decreases, so should the expected level of performance. When 
competitive intelligence is based on quality data and sound analysis, the resulting 
recommendations are expected to lead to improved individual and organizational performance. 
When competitive intelligence is based on flawed or missing data and results in poor 
recommendations, the performance of the individuals and the organization is expected to decline.  
H3: The positive effect of competitive intelligence on organizational performance against 
the focal competitor is higher when the fidelity of the competitive intelligence is higher. 
Competitive Threat 
Organizations engage in rivalrous behavior through the exchange of attacking and 
defensive competitive actions in one or multiple markets (Chen et al., 1992; Porter, 1980; Smith, 
Grimm, Wally, & Young, 1997). At the industry-level, the intensity of rivalry reflects the 
likelihood of retaliation in response to actions taken by a given organization (Smith et al., 1991). 
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At the dyadic level, the intensity of rivalries will vary among competitors depending on the extent 
to which the competitive threat each poses to the other is subjectively perceived by the focal 
organizations (Porac & Thomas, 1990). The degree of competitive threat perceived may depend, 
in part, on the similarity in the markets each organization is oriented towards (Che, Katila, 
McDonald, & Eisenhardt, 2010) and the relative importance of the market(s) in which they 
compete (Chen, 1996; Chen & Miller, 1994). 
Organizational attention is the socially structured pattern of attention by decision-makers 
in an organization (Ocasio, 1997). Given limits to resources, top managers cannot attend to every 
threat brought to their attention with an equally intensive response (McMullen et al., 2009). As 
such, “among the large repertoire of issues and answers available to decision-makers for 
consideration, decision-makers are more likely to consider and to attend those with greater 
legitimacy, value, and relevance to the organization” (Ocasio, 1997, p.198).  
Ceteris paribus, the perceived competitive threat present within a dyad will be highest 
between a given organization and the organization they see as posing the greatest threat to their 
market position (Chen et al., 2007). However, “Organizations outside of the defined set of rivals 
will be viewed as weaker competitors, will be monitored less closely, and will be understood less 
than organizations included within the category” (Porac & Thomas, 1990, pp. 232–233). 
As the competitive threat perceived by an organization increases, it will draw greater 
attention from managers who will then prioritize the deployment of organizational resources 
towards coping with the threat (Ferrier et al., 1999; Katila, Chen, & Piezunka, 2012; Sirmon, Hitt, 
Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011). If the resource of illicit competitive intelligence is included in a 
threatened organization’s resource pool, its managers would be more willing to use it in an 
increasingly liberal and, likely, conspicuous manner to enhance the effectiveness of resource 
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bundling and deployment. Increased complementary usage of competitive intelligence capabilities 
is expected to lead to better informed deployment decisions and the increased likelihood of gaining 
advantages through the acquisition of asymmetric information. 
H4: The positive effect of competitive intelligence on organizational performance is higher 
when the focal competitor’s competitive threat is higher. 
EMPIRICAL SETTING 
 Nuke Laloosh (pitcher): You told him I was throwing a deuce, right? 
Crash Davis (catcher): Yep. He really crushed that dinger, didn't he? Must have gone 450 feet...  
-Dialogue from the film Bull Durham, 1988 
Pitchers in MLB are highly specialized players who are tasked with throwing the ball to 
the batter in such a way that it will result in the batter getting out. Batters can be put out by 
defenders after hitting a ball in play, or they can accrue three strikes either from swinging and 
missing a pitch, or not swinging at a pitch that an umpire standing behind the catcher judges was 
in the strike zone, an area above home plate and between the batters knees and the middle of their 
torso. There are numerous types of pitches thrown with different grips but there are two primary 
categories; one being fastballs that typically travel along a straight line at high speed and the other 
being breaking balls that are thrown with a different type of grip inducing spin that causes the ball 
to break from a straight line and typically at a slower speed than a fastball. Some pitchers may 
possess only one type of pitch, such as the knuckleball of Tim Wakefield (Francona & 
Shaughnessy, 2013) while others like the legendary Satchel Paige will possess a vast repertoire of 
pitches (Tye, 2009) and everything in between. Pitchers in MLB are also typically capable of 
locating their pitches within or outside of the strike zone with varying degrees of precision. With 
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the multitude of possible combinations of pitch types and locations, communication via signals 
between a pitcher and catcher is a vital aspect of professional baseball. 
The tradition of seeking out superior information to gain an advantage is marked 
throughout the history of the game of baseball (Morris, 2006). Sign stealing is the practice of 
observing the communications between pitchers and catchers, deciphering their meaning, and 
communicating the interpretation to teammates. This practice is typically accomplished by a 
baserunner on second base, whose position directly behind the pitcher allows him to see the 
catcher’s signals, whereas runners on first and third base have their vision obstructed by the 
squatting catcher’s legs. The runner on second can communicate his interpretation of the signals 
to the batter through various subtle motions in order to avoid detection. The practice of sign 
stealing via baserunners is normatively frowned upon, but also expected to the extent that teams 
take precautionary measures to prevent it from occurring (Dickson, 2003). For example, different 
sets of signals may be employed when the bases are empty versus when a runner is on second base 
(Francona & Shaughnessy, 2013; Gamboa & Russell, 2018). 
From early in the 2017 season through the 2018 season, the Houston Astros employed a 
system for communicating to their batter the decoded signs between the catcher and pitcher 
indicating the type of pitch that was forthcoming (Rosenthal & Drellich, 2019). Instead of 
baserunners, this system relied on a closed-circuit camera that was mounted in the Astros’ home 
stadium, directly contravening league rules. From a monitor just inside the hallway leading to the 
dugout, team employees would observe the signals between the opposing catcher and pitcher, and 
when the incoming pitch was identified to be a breaking ball, the employee would signal to the 
batter by loudly striking a garbage can in the hallway leading away from the dugout before the 
pitch was delivered. After it was first implemented at the beginning of the 2017 season, refinement 
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of the system included employing whistles and claps as the audible cues until the garbage can 
strikes were settled on as being the clearest, and its usage began in earnest on May 20, 2017. The 
cheating system was discontinued following the 2018 season according to the league 
commissioner’s official inquiry (Manfred, 2020).   
With respect to the illicit competitive intelligence categories (Paine, 1991), the traditional 
sign-stealing practiced by a baserunner on second, deciphering and communicating signs to his 
teammates, resembles the unsolicited information category, as the intercept of information was 
made possible by the failure of the opponent to adequately disguise the communication of signals 
despite knowing that the threat existed. The Astro’s system, however, falls under the more 
egregious covert collection category, as the violation of privacy did not result from forfeiture on 
the part of the victim, but through active and unconsented-to observation by the perpetrator. 
DATA AND SAMPLE 
The dataset was compiled from multiple sources. The data on individual pitches for all 30 
teams from 2014-2018 were sourced from MLB’s proprietary Savant Statcast search tool. The data 
on season-level performance were sourced from Baseballreference.com. The data on the system 
signals were taken from the “sign stealing scandal” website created by Tony Adams. Adams used 
audio recording equipment to generate a spectrogram during a viewing of every Houston Astros 
game in the 2017 season. Through analysis of the spectrogram, Adams detected the unique 
frequency that presented when an Astros employee banged the garbage can. Adams made the data 
available to the public from his website signstealingscandal.com. 
After the main dataset was compiled, it was reduced it down to only those pitches involving 
the Houston Astros. Calculations of game level measures were made, then the sample was again 
reduced from the individual pitch to the game level. The sample was further reduced by removing 
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those observations from 2014 that took place before the management from the cheating period was 
appointed, and from 2017 that took place before 5-28 of that year, as these observations included 
a period of time where the cheating system was being tested and fine-tuned, leading to potentially 
corrupt data (Axisa, 2020; Manfred, 2020; Vigdor, 2020). For the testing of Hypothesis 3, a final 
reduction was made removing the 2018 season from the dataset, as data on recorded garbage can 
strikes were not available for this season, although the sign stealing system was still used through 
this season.   
ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
A difference-in-differences approach is used for examining the link between asymmetric 
information and performance at the batting team-game level to exploit the fact that the Astros’ use 
of their system to collect, analyze and communicate illicit competitive intelligence was (1) 
observable with regard to the temporal period of use, the degree to which it was used, and the 
accuracy with which the system successfully identified and communicated the competitor’s action, 
and (2) delineated between two observable groups – the Astros at home where the hardware 
necessary for the system to function was installed, and the Astros away from home where their 
system was unavailable to them. Thus, the Astros’ games as the home team are designated the 
treatment group, while the Astros’ games as the away team are designated the control group. This 
also allows for the control of the variation in the Astros at home and away by observing 
performance over a time period before the sign-stealing system was first implemented.   
MEASURES 
The two variables used to delineate between groups in the difference-in-differences 
approach are Home, an indicator for whether the focal team is the home team in a given game, and 
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Cheat Period, an indicator for whether a given game took place after the date of 5-28-2017, which 
is the date that the Astros’ garbage can signaling system began in earnest12.  
Performance. Performance is measured using a team’s on-base percentage plus slugging 
score in a given game. OPS is highly correlated (0.95) with runs scored (Tango, Lichtman, & 
Dolphin, 2007), which is the sought after outcome of offensive performance, with a degree of 
granularity that allows for greater precision and observed variance than simply measuring runs 
scored would allow. OPS is the sum of on-base percentage and slugging score, which represent 
the percentage of at bats that don’t result in an out and the number of bases a player records per at 
bat respectively. Because positive team-level outcomes of at-bats can result in an out, such as 
moving a baserunner from second to third with one out, the standard calculation of on base 
percentage is adjusted to consider those events as equivalent to intentional sacrifices. 
Pitch Variety. Pitch variety measures how mixed the approach of the opposing team is in 
terms of the types of pitches thrown against the batters for the Houston Astros. As discussed, there 
are two primary categories of pitches in baseball – fastballs which can include 4-seam fastballs, 2-
seam fastballs, split-finger fastballs, cutters and sinkers; and non-fastballs which comprises all 
other pitch types including, but not limited to, changeups, curveballs, sliders, and knuckleballs. 
The cheating system employed by the Houston Astros used bangs on a garbage can to signal if the 
next pitch was determined to be a non-fastball, while the absence of garbage can bangs indicated 
a fastball or an inconclusive interpretation. 
Pitch variety is calculated by taking the percentage of non-fastballs out of all pitches in the 
observed game, then subtracting 50 from this percentage, and taking the absolute value of this 
 
12 While garbage can strikes had been recorded prior to this date, multiple parties involved indicated in subsequent 
interviews that this was a “fine tuning” period (Lindbergh, 2019; Rosenthal & Drellich, 2019). Consistent with these 
interviews is the fact that the number of recorded strikes on 05-28-2017 were twenty-eight, far exceeding the previous 
high that season of six recorded on 05-23-2017. 
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result. Thus, the measure represents the absolute divergence from an even split of fastballs and 
non-fastballs and is indifferent as to which type was used more or less. A score of 100 represents 
an even split between fastballs and non-fastballs pitched in the observed game, while a score of 50 
would indicate the absence of either fastballs or non-fastballs. Therefore, an increase of one unit 
indicates more variety in the types of pitches employed by the opposing team against the Astros.   
Fidelity. The fidelity of asymmetric information is determined by the accuracy of the 
signals communicated to the recipient batter. This is measured with the percentage of recorded 
garbage can strikes that accurately signaled the non-fastball nature of the upcoming pitch for a 
given game. 
Competitive Threat. The threat represented by a given opponent to the organization’s 
position is proxied by an indicator for whether the opposing team is in the same division as the 
focal team. In this case, the focal team is the Houston Astros who compete in the American League 
West Division against the Oakland Athletics, Seattle Mariners, and Texas Rangers. Teams within 
a division play each other more often during a season than they play outside teams. The goal of 
each regular season for every team in MLB is to qualify for the postseason playoffs by having a 
better overall record than all other teams in the division13. As they compete more often and for a 
common goal, the competitive tension between two teams within a given division will be greater 
than that between interdivisional teams. 
Controls. To control for the quality of the opposing team’s pitching and defense as an 
explanation of batter performance, ERA Score is used, a measure of the compiled season-level 
earned-run-average (ERA) of each opposing pitcher in a given game, weighted by the percentage 
 
13 Teams may also reach the playoffs through a wild card spot that is awarded to whichever team, among those 
finishing second in their division, had the best regular season record. 
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of total batters each of them faced. ERA functions inversely to quality, so a higher ERA represents 
a worse pitching and defense outcome.  
To control for heterogeneity in amplifying or suppressing runs scored among the different 
MLB ballparks, Park Factor is used which is a number above, below or equal to a neutral impact 
of 100 in a given season, taken from Fangraphs.com. Though the effects of the Astros’ home 
ballpark are already controlled for, this controls for variations in the ballparks they play in as 
visitors. 
 Table 11 compiles the descriptive statistics for the variables, while Table 12 comprises the 
correlation matrices for the full sample, and Table 13 comprises the correlation matrices for the 
sample that includes measures for Fidelity. 
RESULTS 
 The results for the regressions testing hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4 are summarized in Table 
14. The ERA Score control variable has a positive and statistically significant coefficient in all of 
the models, which suggest some face validity to the estimated results. To test the main effects of 
the usage of illicit competitive intelligence on performance (Hypothesis 1), the first model tests 
the difference-in-differences estimator by interacting the binary variables of home and cheat, along 
with the pitch variety and intra-division variables and all controls. The coefficient for the 
interaction term representing the treatment effect of using the cheating system is statistically 
insignificant and negative, contrary to the hypothesized direction.  
 To test H2, a moderated difference-in-differences model builds on the base model test for 
the main effects by including the pitch variety variable in a three-way interaction with the 
additional component interactions pitch variety with home and pitch variety with cheat. The 
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coefficient representing the moderation effect is statistically insignificant and slightly negative, 
contrary to the hypothesized direction. 
 To test H3, a moderated difference-in-differences model is regressed on a reduced 
sample.14 As the Fidelity variable is perfectly correlated with home and cheat, as there were no 
signals in the pre-cheating period and no signals in away games during the cheating period, the 
moderated treatment effect is tested for by the variable itself, the three-way and associated two-
way effects are unnecessary. The coefficient representing the moderation effect is significant at 
the .10 level, however, its sign is negative, which is contrary to the hypothesized direction.  
 To test H4, a moderated difference-in-differences model builds on the base model test for 
the main effects by including the intra-division variable in a three-way interaction with the 
additional component interactions intra-division with home and intra-division with cheat. The 
coefficient representing the moderation effect is statistically significant at the .10 level, however, 
its sign is negative, which is contrary to the hypothesized direction. 
Additional sensitivity checks were made using alternative measures for the variables. For 
the variable representing the variability of pitches, two additional alternative measures were 
calculated. First, the Expected Deviation in pitching is calculated using the pitching statistics of 
the opposing team’s pitchers. For each pitcher, the mean share of off-speed balls, as well as the 
standard deviation (square root of variance) of share of off-speed balls, is calculated for their 
previous 5 appearances. The latter measure represents the degree to which pitchers have been 
varying their composition of fastballs and off-speed balls across recent games. Expected 
Deviation for any given game is then calculated by taking a weighted average of this measure 
 
14 As stated, the 2018 season in which cheating occurred is not included as there isn’t available data on the frequency 
or accuracy of garbage can bangs. In addition, the observations missing this measure (from 2015 and 2016) have been 
included in the sample by replacing the missing values with zero. 
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across all individual pitchers who pitched in the game, where the weights are the fraction of batters 
that face each pitcher in the focal game. The second variable, Pitching Deviation, is the deviation 
of the opponent’s pitching in a game relative to their “expected” mix of fastballs and off-speed 
balls based on recent games. The weighted mean share of off-speed balls is calculated, again using 
the fraction of batters that face each pitcher in the focal game as weights. Then, this expected share 
of off-speed balls is subtracted from the actual share of off-speed balls in that game, and its 
absolute value taken to obtain Pitching Deviation. Both these variables are then used as measures 
of variability in the D-I-D regression models. 
For the variable representing the competitive threat, an alternative measure was calculated 
to reflect the overall quality of the opponent relative to the Astros, based on their Pythagorean 
record at the time. Pythagorean record was originally developed by Bill James as a measure for 
the performance of a baseball team that can be an alternative to traditional wins and losses (Tango 
et al., 2007). By basing the measure on the total runs scored against total runs allowed instead of 
wins and losses, Pythagorean record is a more precise measure of a team’s quality. The 
Pythagorean record is calculated by taking runs scored over runs scored plus runs allowed, with 
an exponent for each term of 1.83. The relative competitive threat is the absolute value of the 
difference between the Pythagorean Records of the Houston Astros and its opponent at the time of 
the matchup. 
Each alternative variable for the sensitivity tests was tested in the manner of their 
counterpart, as presented in Table 15. Consistent with the original models, none of the coefficients 
for the three-way interactions are statistically significant. 
A final check is made for testing the parallel trends assumption. Presented in Figure 2. are 
the trendlines for the coefficients in a controlled regression of Astros’ Game OPS, with bins of 
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approximately 20 games for each category of home and away. The treatment line indicates the 
beginning of the cheating period. Trends appear to converge the season prior to the treatment, then 
diverge following the treatment.  
DISCUSSION 
As seen in the results, the models fail to corroborate any of the hypotheses. Indeed, for 
Hypotheses 3 and 4, the results point in the opposite direction to what was hypothesized and are 
weakly statistically significant.  
The results somewhat surprisingly fail to show evidence for advantages from asymmetric 
information derived from illicit competitive intelligence, and it is important to consider potential 
post hoc explanations for this lack of support, which may also enrich our understanding of the 
performance advantages of illicit competitive intelligence. These three explanations described 
below are professional identity, information markets, and disruption of routines, which are derived 
primarily from established literatures and are also cited in the baseball press.15 
Professional identity. The social identity literature suggests that people define themselves 
through affiliation with distinct social groups (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). 
When the norms of these groups come into conflict, it can result in cognitive incoherence and a 
reduction in self-esteem (Hogg & Reid, 2006). 
For professional athletes, playing a sport for a living is a culmination of a lifetime of hard 
work and practice, and once they’ve made it to the top, there is immense pressure to maintain their 
peak performance lest they lose their position. Constantly performing under these high-pressure 
conditions may have adverse effects on the mental health of professional athletes, who may be 
 
15 Exploratory studies in the baseball media question the benefits from the sign-stealing scheme and suggest that the 
penalty from inaccurate signals may have offset positive benefits (Arthur, 2020; Clemens, 2020; Mailhot, 2019)  
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more psychologically fragile than the general population. Many athletes succumb to the pressure, 
turning to substance abuse (Bouton, 1970; Gamboa & Russell, 2018; Tewksbury & Miller, 2018). 
MLB Teams frequently employ mental health coaches or even trained psychologists to see to the 
mental health of players (Tewksbury & Miller, 2018). 
One of the mechanisms players use to cope is through attachment of their identity to the 
sport they play and to the team they play for (Grohsjean, Kober, & Zucchini, 2016; Kopelman & 
Pantaleno, 1977). Camaraderie and individual satisfaction stemming from team success help 
players to navigate the pressures (Bouton, 1970; Francona & Shaughnessy, 2013; Ortiz & 
Massarotti, 2007). When events occur that undermine a player’s attachment to their team and/or 
sport, such as being traded or cut, it can trigger negative assessments of their identity and have 
severe effects on their self-esteem and subsequent performance (Tewksbury & Miller, 2018).  
As stated, the use of illicit competitive intelligence brings up a litany of ethical concerns 
(Crane, 2005). The managers involved in such practices may not understand until afterwards the 
questionable ethics behind them, after which they may show contrition and seek out restorative 
actions as penance (Caudron, 1994; Gelb et al., 1991; Penenberg & Barry, 2000). The sign-stealing 
system may negatively affect the self-esteem and identity of players through their attachment to 
both their team and their sport. At the team-level, they may be wary of endangering their team’s 
status should the scheme be discovered. At the sport-level, they may be concerned that the use of 
the system damages the integrity of the game they have devoted their lives to and puts into question 
their ability to perform at the highest level without cheating. Undermining these attachments can 
reduce the player’s self-esteem, which could explain why their performance without using the 
system was better than with it. 
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Information markets. When illicit competitive intelligence activities were predicted to 
increase with the competitive threat, the possibility of competitive response was assumed out of 
the model. While the perceived competitive threat within a dyad may be asymmetric, in this case, 
the factors that increase the perceived competitive threat for the focal organization are shared with 
its competitors.  
According to the competitive action literature, three characteristics of a competitive action 
are salient in predicting the likelihood of a rival’s reaction: scope, threat and radicality (Grimm et 
al., 2006). When the competitive threat perceived by specific competitors is high, ceteris paribus, 
it  increases likelihood that those specific competitors will take actions in response to strengthen 
their own position or weaken the position of the initiator (Chen et al., 1992). 
As such, it is reasonable that the organizations representing a stronger competitive threat 
would be likely to respond to competitive actions taken by the focal organization. Given that illicit 
competitive intelligence activity may constitute a competitive action, in lieu of seeking recourse 
through sanctions imposed by a third party, a response to such an action may also be within the 
domain of competitive intelligence. For example, a rival could use counterintelligence strategies 
to undermine the competitive intelligence capabilities of the focal organization, effectively turning 
the advantage derived from its competitive intelligence capability into a disadvantage. 
Among all their competitors, the Astros represent the greatest competitive threat to the 
other teams in their division, thus they are more likely to take reactive steps. In addition to the 
positive impact of beating the Astros themselves, the Astros losing to any other team in their 
division would also represent a positive outcome for AL West teams, as the Astros were atop the 
division standings for most of the season. As such, an AL West team’s response might even include 
informing the other teams in the division about the system the Astros were using, as any detriments 
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to division leaders are beneficial to the teams below them in the division standings. If the Astros 
divisional opponents were aware of their system for cheating, but the Astros are unaware of their 
knowledge, this would represent asymmetric information which the Astros’ divisional opponents 
could use to their advantage.16 
Disruption of routines. 
Crash Davis Inner Monologue: “Relax. Relax. Quick bat. Pop the clubhead. Open the hips. 
Relax. You’re thinking too much. Get outta your…head, Crash”  
-Dialogue from the film Bull Durham, 1988 
Organizational routines are regular and predictable patterns of organizations that underpin 
their capabilities and take shape over time (Feldman, 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
Organizational routines may consist partially or entirely of tacit elements, which can be an 
important factor in determining the persistence of the superior performance they provide17 
(Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011; Polanyi, 1966). Certain events such as employee 
movement, technological changes, acquisitions, and acts of god can disrupt routines which may 
require a period of time to redevelop, during which performance may suffer (Anderson & Lewis, 
2014; Campbell, Saxton, & Banerjee, 2014; Paruchuri, Nerkar, & Hambrick, 2006).  
Nelson and Winter (1982) use the skills of individuals as a metaphor for the routines that 
organizations develop (Parmigiani & Howard-Grenville, 2011). According to Nelson and Winter, 
“There is…a limit imposed by the feasible time rate of information transfer through symbolic 
communication, which may be well below the rate necessary or appropriate in the actual 
 
16 This theoretical ad hoc explanation could be picked up empirically by the signal fidelity variable, as the resulting 
competitive actions from opponents would emerge through degradations in the reliability of the Astros system. It may 
be the case that the diffusion of information took a longer time than one season and, lacking data on signal fidelity for 
2018, it may not be apparent based on 2017 data alone.  
17 Though not necessarily (Knott, 2003). 
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performance. In the case of serving a tennis ball or performing a gymnastic stunt, the law of gravity 
imposes a tight constraint on the rate at which critical portions of the maneuver are performed. 
Thus, although step-by-step description is possible, and pretrial instruction and posttrial criticism 
are both helpful, it is not realistic to offer detailed instruction during an attempt…Although the 
learner can attempt to store pretrial instruction in memory and consciously retrieve it as the action 
is performed, the effectiveness of this tactic is severely limited by the speed and simultaneity of the 
information processing required” (1982, p.80). 
According to Holmstrom (1979, p.87), “…any informative signal, regardless of how noisy 
it is, will have positive value (if costlessly obtained and administered into the contract).” However, 
as previously discussed, the quality of data is key to determining organizational outcomes from its 
competitive intelligence capability. One dimension of data quality (which was not examined in 
this chapter) is its relevance (Fox et al., 1994). Data that arrive too late to contribute, even if it they 
are perfectly accurate, could be of lesser value than less accurate data that are received with 
sufficient time to make adjustments to routines (Redman, 1995). Data arriving too late may also 
be of lesser value than no data at all when adjustments to routines feature time-compression 
diseconomies, resulting in higher costs than would be realized if no adjustments to routines were 
made. As such, a key determinant of the quality of data is the degree of velocity in the environment 
to which they are relevant. High velocity environments, characterized by volatility and rapid and 
discontinuous change, often render the information used by decision-makers inaccurate, 
unavailable, or obsolete (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988).  
For professional baseball players, hitting is a highly tacit skill that depends on muscle 
memory, years of repetition, hand-eye coordination, and fast twitch nerves (Gamboa & Russell, 
2018; Shanks, 2005; Wheeler, 2015). Hitting takes place in, literally, a high velocity environment, 
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where pitches from no more than 60 feet and 6 inches away often reach upwards of 100 miles per 
hour and requires the batter to decide whether, when, where and how hard to swing in a time 
measured in milliseconds (Lewis, 2004; Ortiz & Massarotti, 2007; Wheeler, 2015). The addition 
of asymmetric information about the next pitch they are going to see would seem to be helpful, 
however, it requires the baseball player to make nearly instantaneous adjustments to their standard 
approach they would take if they did not have this information in advance. Adaptation of their 
routines to accommodate the additional information is unlikely to be helpful when baseball teams 
are constantly alternating between home and away games where they would need to rely on their 
traditional approach. As such, the results might be attributable to a tradeoff between the added 
value of asymmetric information of an explicit nature and the disruption of long-established and 
highly tacit routines connected to information-processing.18 
An additional argument for the disruption to routines explanation stems from the presence 
of inaccurate signals in a significant minority of cases. If the batter has less confidence in the 
accuracy of the signal, it becomes especially difficult to adjust their well-practiced and time-
critical routines to the incoming pitch. It is difficult enough for the batter to adapt to the new 
routine of hearing and responding to the signal, to also account for the potential inaccuracy of the 
signal is likely to be one complexity too far in adapting their batting routines. The proximity of 
batters to the area targeted by the pitcher can also lead to the batter being hit by the pitch, in which 
case they are awarded first base akin to reaching four balls in the at-bat. Between the two categories 
of pitches, batters are relatively more likely to be seriously hurt when they are hit by fastballs given 
their higher velocity and straight-on trajectory. In response to the cheating system’s forecast of a 
breaking ball, batters may commit beforehand to leaning out over the plate to improve their 
 
18 The disruption of routines could be increasingly effective when purposefully done using the previous explanation 
of information markets diffusing knowledge of the Astros’ system across their competition as a complement. 
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likelihood of making strong contact with a swing, and are thus more vulnerable to getting seriously 
injured if the signal proved to be an error. These additional consequences then serve as a distinction 
between inaccuracies in bangs and inaccuracies of omissions and this distinction would command 
greater focus on the part of the decision maker (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Objective 
assessment of the utility of outcomes and their likelihood are not separable, especially under 
conditions of extremely negative consequences associated, such as personal harm, balanced 
against disproportionately modest positive outcomes, such as getting a hit (Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Finkenauer, & Vohs, 2001; Weber, 1994). The potential for bang signals to be 
inaccurate, along with the disproportionately negative outcomes associated with an inaccurate 
breaking ball signal will cause rational batters to have to account for this asymmetric loss function 
as they go through the process of reacting to an incoming pitch, likely exacerbating the disruption 
of the routine.      
CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the effects of asymmetric information from illicit competitive 
intelligence on organizational performance, as well as some conditions that could potentially 
moderate these effects. Competitive intelligence has become a widespread accepted practice across 
industries as an essential component to an organization’s understanding of the environment in 
which it competes and the rivals against whom it competes (Gelb et al., 1991). However, as a 
source of competitive advantage, organizations may go beyond standard competitive intelligence 
as defined by normative institutions, like SCIP, and engage in illicit competitive intelligence 
practices. Despite the ethical concerns surrounding these practices, key decision-makers may 
justify the means by the ends. While it is not possible to know the extent to which organizations 
are engaging in illicit competitive intelligence due to the necessarily clandestine nature of these 
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practices, there are many documented cases where parties engaging in such behavior were 
discovered (Paine, 1991).  
The likely widespread presence of the phenomenon of illicit competitive intelligence 
practices coupled with a lack of empirical scrutiny on its actual effects on organizational 
performance makes such a study worthwhile, should a suitable empirical context present itself. 
The case of the Houston Astros cheating scandal is uniquely suited for this purpose. The practice 
of covert surveillance used is a clear-cut case of illicit competitive intelligence. The level of 
granularity and precision of data allows for valid measures of performance and the documented 
testimony, video evidence, and auditory analysis provides reliable measures of usage. 
As a complement to competitive actions, illicit competitive intelligence should provide an 
advantage to organizations in dyadic competitive engagements. Under circumstances of greater 
uncertainty as to competitor behavior, higher fidelity of the competitive intelligence 
communication, and likelihood of increased usage to cope with greater perceived threats, the 
positive effects of illicit competitive intelligence should be more pronounced.  
It was rather surprising, therefore, to find no evidence supporting this in the empirical tests 
conducted. It would, of course, be overly presumptive to conclude from these findings that illicit 
competitive intelligence does not improve organizational performance. However, the particular 
circumstances in which this practice of illicit competitive intelligence was used may be relevant 
to better understanding the phenomenon. As discussed, the cheating scheme was a clear-cut 
violation of normative behavior for professional baseball players. Perhaps in different contexts 
where norms are less pronounced or ethical behavior less lauded, illicit competitive intelligence 
would be more contributive to performance. Further, given the importance placed on winning and 
the potential negative fallout from discovery, it is somewhat surprising that the Astros’ system 
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involving a single camera, a monitor, and a low paygrade team employee sitting in a hallway 
smacking a garbage can was as crude as it was. The use of a more sophisticated system, where 
data are collected and interpreted with greater accuracy and precision, and the analysis is 
communicated with greater timeliness and clarity, may also lead to improvement in organizational 
performance.  
While corporate espionage can include violations of the criminal code such as fraud, 
extortion, and breaking and entering, the illicitness in the empirical setting used here is limited to 
a violation of rules set forth by MLB and, therefore, any sanctions as a result of these actions would 
theoretically be limited to that which can be imposed by the league and/or within civil lawsuits. In 
other words, there was no violation of criminal codes. That said, the sanctions handed down by 
the league were substantial, although the players who participated in the cheating were spared 
punishment due to their cooperation. The team was fined $5 million and forced to forfeit their top 
draft picks. Both the General Manager and Field Manager were suspended for a year and 
subsequently fired by the organization. A player and assistant manager who had since been 
elevated to field managers were also fired by their new organizations. Lawsuits have been filed by 
multiple parties including sports betting websites, season ticket holders, as well as players who 
believed their careers had been adversely affected by the scheme. 
Yet, for all the trouble that came about because of it, the results from this particular study 
seem to suggest that the Astros gained little to nothing from engaging in this cheating scheme.  
Future research could further support or dispel these implications by exploiting the granularity of 
this particular dataset to consider the individual player, or even the individual pitch level to test 
under what conditions illicit competitive intelligence could contribute to improved performance. 
The age and experience of the players involved may be one of these factors, aging players with 
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declining skills may be more apt to use and derive improved performance from the system. Aside 
from performance effects, another interesting area to examine may be the factors determining 
whether a given player used or did not use the system and, if they had ethical concerns, did they 
not come forward at the time. Should the results remain consistently negative in terms of 
performance gains from this particular usage of illicit competitive intelligence, future research 
could examine other contexts based on the theoretical perspectives from the post hoc explanations.  
A qualitative study of other documented cheating cases could shine a light on the 
professional identity explanation by probing the thoughts and emotions of those party to the 
cheating experienced at the time. Similarly, a lab experiment where random participants are 
offered the use of illicit competitive intelligence in competitive games against other participants 
could be a tool to see whether cheating effects self-esteem and subsequent performance. 
For the markets for information explanation, retrospective interviews of the Astros’ 
opponents could be conducted to determine whether or not they were aware of, and took advantage 
of, the Astros’ cheating system. However, it is conjectured here that the recency of the events may 
dampen the forthrightness of relevant parties who may still be competing professionally and may 
thus be hesitant to disclose information that they may still realize a competitive advantage from. 
As such, this type of inquiry may require some time to pass before it would be enlightening.  
For the disruption of routines explanation, in line with the work of Herbert Simon (1982), 
the benefits in making decisions using asymmetric information would seem to decline as the 
capacity limit for processing that information is approached and/or exceeded, leading to 
information overload. Future research could look at whether these negative effects replicate in 
similar contexts characterized by high velocity and tacit routines, as well as whether performance 
effects from illicit competitive intelligence are positive in empirical contexts featuring lower 
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velocity environments, not requiring frequent adjustments, and where illicit competitive 
intelligence is disseminated in a timely manner. The evolution of commodity trading, from 
individual traders giving put and call signals based on the relatively slow dissemination of 
information to the highly automated, flash trading conducted today could be a possible setting to 
further test this explanation, possibly using documented cases of insider trading as the proxy for 
illicit competitive intelligence.   
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Tables and Figure 
Table 11. Summary Statistics 
 
 Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
 Game OPS 598 .737 .238 .105 1.482 
 Home 598 .493 .5 0 1 
 Cheating 598 .458 .499 0 1 
 Variation 598 87.159 8.605 57 100 
 Intradivision 598 .47 .5 0 1 
 Fidelity 36 .793 .197 0 1 
 ERA Score 598 4.306 .971 1.635 9.91 
 Park Factor 598 97.935 5.888 91 120 
 
 
Table 12. Correlation Matrix, Full Sample 
 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7) 
 (1) Game OPS 1.000 
 (2) Home -0.008 1.000 
 (3) Cheating 0.087 -0.015 1.000 
 (4) Variation 0.053 0.038 0.053 1.000 
 (5) Intradivision -0.019 -0.004 0.002 -0.048 1.000 
 (6) ERA Score 0.299 -0.018 0.069 0.113 -0.012 1.000 
 (7) Park Factor 0.074 -0.489 0.146 -0.023 -0.090 0.024 1.000 
 
Table 13. Correlation Matrix, Fidelity Measures Only 
 
  Variables   (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
 (1) Game OPS 1.000 
 (2) Home . . 
 (3) Cheating . . . 
 (4) Variation -0.018 . . 1.000 
 (5) Intradivision -0.063 . . -0.489 1.000 
 (6) Fidelity -0.265 . . 0.602 -0.304 1.000 
 (7) ERA Score 0.482 . . 0.035 -0.060 -0.022 1.000 





Table 14. Regression Results (Dependent Variable=Game OPS) 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
       Main 
Effect (H1) 
   Variation 
(H2) 
   Fidelity 
(H3) 
   Threat (H4) 
 Home .041 .02 .067** .005 
   (.028) (.249) (.028) (.038) 
 Cheating .052** -.002 .064* .036 
   (.026) (.276) (.034) (.036) 
 Home*Cheat -.053 .157 .079 .012 
   (.037) (.387) (.065) (.052) 
 Variation 0 .001 .001 0 
   (.001) (.002) (.001) (.001) 
 Intradivision -.004 -.005 -.012 -.026 
   (.019) (.019) (.021) (.037) 
 ERA Score .072*** .072*** .075*** .071*** 
   (.01) (.01) (.011) (.01) 
 Park Factor .003* .003* .007*** .003 
   (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
 Home*Variation  0   
    (.003)   
 Cheat*Variation  .001   
    (.003)   
 Home*Cheat*Vrtn  -.002   
    (.004)   
 Fidelity   -.132*  
     (.077)  
 Home*Intradivision    .074 
      (.051) 
 Cheat*Intradivision    .036 
      (.053) 
 Home*Cheat*Intdvn    -.139* 
      (.075) 
 _cons .052 .044 -.425 .099 
   (.213) (.262) (.262) (.216) 
 Observations 598 598 436 598 
 R-squared .102 .102 .152 .108 
Standard errors are in parentheses 






Table 15. Sensitivity Analyses (Dependent Variable=Game OPS) 
 
      (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
       Main 
Effect Exp 
Dev 
   Main Effect 
Pitch Dev 
  Interactions 
Exp Dev 
  Interactions 
Pitch Dev 
  Interactions 
Rel Threat 
w/Pitch Dev 
  Interactions 
Rel Threat 
w/Exp Dev 
 Home .049* .047* .014 .104*** .086** .084** 
   (.026) (.027) (.079) (.038) (.035) (.035) 
 Cheating .062** .066** .087 .11*** .016 .01 
   (.027) (.028) (.082) (.041) (.043) (.043) 
 Home*Cheat -.052 -.057 .031 -.1* -.016 -.021 
   (.037) (.038) (.128) (.059) (.063) (.063) 
 ERA Score .073*** .074*** .073*** .074*** .074*** .073*** 
   (.01) (.01) (.01) (.011) (.01) (.01) 
 Park Factor .004** .004** .004** .004* .004* .003** 
   (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) (.002) 
 Expected Deviation .932***  .991***   .922*** 
   (.168)  (.281)   (.169) 
 Relative Threat -.104 -.111 -.11 -.105 .053 .003 
   (.089) (.092) (.088) (.095) (.2) (.224) 
 Pitching Deviation  .071  .755** .06  
    (.196)  (.345) (.198)  
 Home*ExpDev   .202    
     (.431)    
 Cheat*ExpDev   -.14    
     (.415)    
 Home*Cheat*ExpDev   -.487    
     (.71)    
 Home*PitchingDev    -.966**   
      (.455)   
 Cheat*PitchingDev    -.774   
      (.615)   
 Home*Cheat*PtchDev    .7   
      (.864)   
 Home*RelThreat     -.417* -.366 
       (.233) (.254) 
 Cheat*RelThreat     .15 .192 
       (.242) (.261) 
 Home*Cheat*RelThrt     .014 .032 
       (.319) (.337) 
 _cons -.118 .037 -.124 -.003 .033 -.11 
   (.184) (.188) (.185) (.192) (.188) (.184) 
 Observations 598 598 598 598 598 598 
 R-squared .146 .104 .149 .111 .114 .156 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
This dissertation looked at two different sources of asymmetric information and their 
effects on organizational performance. The first source was residual knowledge, the knowledge 
that remains within an organization pertaining to its former resources that are with a competitor. 
The second source was illicit competitive intelligence, the private information of a competitor that 
is acquired through illicit data collection methods. Each source of asymmetric information is 
underexplored in the literature in its own way – residual knowledge being largely overlooked 
conceptually and illicit competitive intelligence lacking robust empirical examination. 
The concept of residual knowledge is connected it to several literatures including the 
resource-based view, the knowledge-based view, resource management, employee mobility, and 
strategic factor markets. These literatures collectively imply both the existence of performance-
enhancing, asymmetric information pertaining to an organization’s privately held strategic factors 
and that competitive advantage can be derived from actions focused on the undermining of a 
competitor’s resources. As such, the lack of consideration in the literature regarding asymmetric 
information about former resources that have transferred to a competitor as a potential source of 
competitive advantage is noteworthy.   
To test the contingent effects of residual knowledge on performance, the context of Major 
League Baseball is used, where the mobility of strategic factors between dyadically competing 
organizations is a common occurrence and the individual performance of batters is separable from 
organizational performance. While agnostic as to main effects of residual knowledge on 
organizational performance, conditional hypotheses included a negative moderating effect from 
analytics usage and former employee quality, with positive moderating effects from the quality of 
the organization’s managerial capital. Evidence was not found to support the hypotheses related 
to managerial and employee quality, however, the coefficient for the analytics hypothesis in the 
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primary tests and subsequent robustness checks was statistically significant. The results suggest 
that the knowledge generated through a systematic method of quantitative, fact-based analysis of 
publicly available data may erode competitive advantages derived from asymmetric information. 
Thus, a contribution to the literature pertains to the possibility for analytics to serve as a remedy 
for asymmetric information across an industry.  
A possible extension of this research would be to look at how analytics-focused 
competitors apply analytics to their internally sourced data and see whether any previous 
advantage derived from residual knowledge can again be realized by doing so. In the empirical 
context of baseball, for example, there is evidence supporting the utility of applying analytics to 
publicly available data. In the future, the possibility for privately held data on former employees 
to provide an advantage may return given an improvement in the quality of exclusive data 
available. While granular, in-game performance data is currently available to the public, advances 
in the collection of biometric data using wearable sensors during games remains privately held by 
the organization. The regulations governing the ownership and usage of biometric data on 
employees are currently at a nascent “Wild West” stage (Bates, 2020), and those possessing this 
data may be able to utilize it in the future for purposes beyond the ostensible safety and health of 
the user (Osborne & Cunningham, 2017). 
Potential extensions for further examination of the residual knowledge concept could 
include human resources in different contexts as well as non-human strategic factors. In the first 
case, the context of Major League Baseball is suited for the study of residual knowledge pertaining 
to former employees because of the clean measures for movement and performance of individual 
employees specific to given organizations, However, other contexts that may also be characterized 
in this way, such as the litigation and political lobbying industries, could be similarly examined 
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for the effects of residual knowledge on performance for generalization purposes. In the second 
case, the residual knowledge concept abstractly pertains to strategic factors that have transferred 
out of an organization. To better ground it conceptually and empirically, the concept is narrowed 
down to specifically discuss human resources and tied to the employee mobility literature. 
However, the possibility that residual knowledge pertaining to non-human capital strategic 
resources could also provide competitive advantage is another avenue for future research. For 
example, the developmental trajectories of research programs within divested units may give 
former organizations better forecasting for the type of innovations being pursued by a competitor 
than the industry at large, possibly allowing for more effective competitive actions in response.  
This dissertation also contributes to the asymmetric information literature as it pertains to 
the use of illicit competitive intelligence as a source of asymmetric information. While the practice 
of illicit competitive intelligence is likely widespread (Caudron, 1994; Paine, 1991; Penenberg & 
Barry, 2000), given its clandestine nature, there is a dearth of empirical research into illicit 
competitive intelligence and its effects on organizational performance. Based on the presumption 
that illicitly acquired competitive intelligence is likely to benefit competitors due to the value of 
the protected knowledge being captured, it was hypothesized that the usage of illicit competitive 
intelligence would lead to improved performance, and especially under conditions of greater 
uncertainty, competitive threat, and signal fidelity. Once again, these hypotheses were tested in the 
empirical context of Major League Baseball, exploiting a specific case where the use of illicit 
competitive intelligence was documented. Over most of the 2017 season through the 2018 season, 
the Houston Astros employed a system of communicating interpretations of the opponent’s pitch 
signs to their own batters thanks to equipment they had illicitly installed in their home stadium. As 
this system was not available to the Astros in away games, a difference-in-differences approach 
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could be used comparing performance in home and away games before and after the 
implementation of the system. Support was not found for any of the hypotheses predicting positive 
organizational performance from the use of illicit competitive intelligence. 
The lack of corroborating evidence for the hypotheses may contribute to the broad field of 
asymmetric information research by the additional questions it prompts.  Conditional factors such 
as the velocity of the environment and the timeliness of communications, the degree of 
routinization of the activities informed, and the ethical implications inherent to the use of illicitly 
acquired information may reduce the effectiveness of competitive intelligence for organizational 
performance. Future research could probe these factors to provide a better understanding of the 
relationship between asymmetric information and organizational performance. 
This dissertation also contributes to the growing body of literature dedicated to the use of 
a sports context for advancing management theory (Day, Gordon, & Fink, 2012; Keidel, 1984; 
Wolfe et al., 2005). Within this body, the specific context of Major League Baseball has been used 
to examine and expand research in resource divestment capabilities (Moliterno & Wiersema, 
2007), resource management (Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008), social capital (Wang & Cotton, 2018), 
developmental networks (Cotton, Shen, & Livne-Tarandach, 2011), interorganizational exchanges 
(Barden & Mitchell, 2007), individual- and unit-level complementarities (Crocker & Eckardt, 
2014). This dissertation broadens the use of the sports context in management research to include 
asymmetric information and strategic factor markets, employee mobility, analytics, and 
competitive intelligence. 
The two empirical studies in this dissertation can also contribute to practice, both generally 
and specifically to the MLB empirical setting used here. Generally, organizations may benefit from 
adopting an approach to evaluating their internal human resources that accounts for the possibility 
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that their employees will move to a competitor in the future. With that possibility in mind, an 
organization’s unique access to its employees enables the collection of unique data and may lead 
to better informed actions in future scenarios where the employee has joined a competitor.  
Each study can also make its own unique contribution to the specific setting of Major 
League Baseball. Chapter 2 finds that advantages teams enjoyed over their former players eroded 
with the increasing emphasis on analytics usage. In line with the adoption of analytics in 
organizational approaches to competing, organizations across baseball engage in searches for 
sources of competitive advantage. The findings indicating a previous advantage for organizations 
over their former players may indicate that the advantage from residual knowledge may be 
revitalized if approached in new and more systematic ways. Using a systematic approach to 
evaluating players under organizational control as future competitors may provide an advantage 
for organizations who take an approach to building their rosters using frequent exchanges, 
increasing the likelihood that a given individual on an opposing team will have, at one point or 
another, been under their own organizational control and thus subject to unique evaluation methods 
not afforded to other organizations relying solely on the publicly available data, sophisticated as it 
may be.  
The results from Chapter 3, which did not show evidence of a positive relationship between 
the usage of illicit competitive intelligence and organizational performance, may contribute to the 
empirical context of Major League Baseball in two notable ways. First, the lack of support for a 
positive relationship coupled with the likelihood of discovery now that league officials are aware 
of schemes of this nature may disincentivize others from attempting to benefit from illicit 
competitive intelligence programs in the future. Second, for the specific case of the Astros’ 2017 
World Series Championship, results suggesting the cheating did not provide them with an unfair 
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advantage lends legitimacy to their retained position as champions and reduces the tarnish of the 
reputations of the Astros and baseball in general that resulted from the fallout. In other words, the 
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